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I. INTRODUCTION 
It has long been argued that the prevailing standard for ensuring that 
courts adjudicate "Cases or Controversies" within the meaning of Article 
III of the Constitution I is as flawed as it is fundamental. Applied most 
prominently in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlije,2 the reigning test for 
standing to bring suit in federal court turns foremost on whether 
plaintiffs have suffered a particularized injury.3 It reflects the belief that 
courts are constrained to hearing citizens' individualized complaints, and 
that so-called "generalized grievances" shared by the populace are not 
constitutionally cognizable even if Congress explicitly granted standing 
to vindicate them. Lujan consequently invalidated an explicit statutory 
grant of standing4 to generic "citizens" on Article III grounds.s 
"Vindicating the public interest," Justice Scalia wrote, "is the function of 
Congress and the Chief Executive.,,6 
Like the statute at issue in Lujan, the Federal Election Commission 
Act (FECA) 7 is relatively unusual legislation because Congress did not 
• Associate Professor of Law, University of Oklahoma College of Law. The author wishes to 
thank Sandra Ahn, John Beckerman, Joe Birkenstock, Lyn Entzeroth, Steve Gensler, Michele 
Gilman, Katheleen Guzman, Leslie Kelleher, Peter Krug, Edith Marshall, Harry Schwirck, Murray 
Tabb, Peter Tague, and Chris Brooks Whitman for comments on prior drafts of this Article. The 
Campaign Legal Center in Washington, D.C., provided valuable research assistance. 
I. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (stating that judicial power extends to certain types of cases 
and controversies). 
2. 504 U.S. 555 (1992). 
3. Id. at 560; see also Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 
167,181 (2000) (articulating standard and citing Lujan). 
4. Endangered Species Act of 1973,16 U.S.C. § I 540(g)(I) (2000). 
5. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The Court's holding that there is an 
outer limit to the power of Congress to confer rights of action is a direct and necessary consequence 
of the case and controversy limitations found in Article 111."); see also Cass R. Sunstein, What's 
Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REv. 163, 165 
(1992) (citing Lujan as prompting "invalidation of an explicit congressional grant of standing to 
'citizens"'). 
6. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 576. 
7. Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (2000); see also infra note 
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confine its enforcement to the Federal Election Commission (FEC or 
Commission), but included a provision enabling a private person to sue 
the FEC in federal court to compel enforcement of the law against a third 
party. 8 The Supreme Court sustained the express reach of the FECA's 
citizen-suit provision in FEe v. Akins,9 which, in the words of Cass R. 
Sunstein, "is by far the most important pronouncement on the general 
issue of standing to obtain information ... [because] the Court appears to 
have held that any citizen has standing to sue under FECA."IO 
Despite the ostensible scope of Akins, the question of whether any 
party has standing to sue the FEC under the FECA's citizen-suit 
provision continues to be relitigated. By relying on Lujan and its 
progeny, the FEC has repeatedly disavowed federal courts' jurisdiction 
to hear challenges to its preinvestigation dismissals of administrative 
complaints, not only defying the Supreme Court's pronouncement in 
Akins, but effectively seeking immunity from such judicial review. 
This Article discusses standing to sue the FEC with two principal 
objectives. First, it attempts to frame the doctrinal inconsistencies 
between Lujan and Akins that have given rise to ongoing FECA standing 
litigation and concludes that the Supreme Court should acknowledge its 
repudiation of Lujan in cases seeking election-related information. 
Second, it explores the question whether courts may be statutorily 
required to consider citizen challenges to FEC enforcement actions as a 
matter of justiciability theory in the first instance, and concludes that 
courts should tum to the oft-overlooked Akins decision in lieu of Lujan in 
reviewing suits brought under citizen-suit statutes generally. I I 
69 (summarizing the FECA's main provisions). 
8. See id. § 437g(a)(8) (stating that an aggrieved party may file a petition if the FEC dismisses 
a complaint or fails to act on a complaint within the stated time period); see also Chamber of 
Commerce of the U.S. v. FEC, 69 F.3d 600, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (characterizing statute as "unusual 
in that it permits a private party to challenge the FEC's decision not to enforce"). 
9. See 524 U.S. II, 19-26 (1998) (holding that voters have standing to bring suit against the 
FEC for not bringing an enforcement action when they were unable to obtain information the FECA 
allegedly required be made public). 
10. Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informational Standing: Akins and 
Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REv. 613, 616 (1999) (citing Akins). Professor Sunstein remarked in 1999 
that, "[r]emarkably, the emerging law governing standing to obtain information has yet to receive 
academic attention." Id. This statement remains accurate today. 
II. Interestingly, in Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438 (2007), a 5-4 majority of the 
Supreme Court recently found that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts had standing to sue the 
EPA to prompt a rulemaking to address global warming. Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens 
appeared to adopt an Akins-like theory of justiciability in a generalized grievance context. See id. at 
1456 (quoting Akins). Chief Justice Roberts vigorously dissented and was joined by Justice Scalia, 
the author of the plurality decision in Lujan. See id. at 1464 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Lujan). Although the majority opinion is most notable for its apparent endowment of "special 
solicitude" to States in Article III standing analysis, Justice Stevens's reliance on Akins for the 
proposition that the fact "[t]hat the[] climate-change risks are 'widely-shared' does not minimize 
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Part II reviews Akins and highlights its subtle but dramatic 
departures from the premises of Lujan. Upholding Congress's power to 
define injury in the FECA itself, the Akins Court largely dispensed with 
the causation and redressability requirements but failed to expressly 
negate conflicting aspects of Lujan. This fundamental inconsistency 
between Akins and Lujan has enabled relitigation of Akins itself in cases 
brought against the FEC. 
Part III develops the theoretical underpinnings of the Akins's 
viewpoint that, although there must be limits on the power of Congress 
to define the scope of Article III standing, the case-or-controversy 
requirement should be interpreted as empowering Congress to legislate 
standing in some measure to spur executive enforcement activity. This 
Part considers standing under the FECA's citizen-suit provision in 
particular as a mechanism for enforcement of the federal campaign and 
election laws, and concludes that Congress's use of such power seems 
reasonable and circumscribed. 
Part IV attempts to reconcile Lujan and Akins and their competing 
theoretical bases. Lujan does not faithfully remain the cohesive force in 
public law in' any event. Rather than uniformly tamping down on 
attempts to vindicate generalized grievances, Supreme Court and lower-
court decisions reflect a recognition that the nature of administrative 
decision making necessarily provokes merits adjudication of less-than-
individualized challenges to Executive Branch activity. Courts should 
therefore resist the FEC's invitation to revert to a strict Lujan application 
of injury-in-fact. This Article proposes that courts apply Akins as 
creating per se standing in FECA cases seeking information, and 
consider its expansion to cases involving FECA-like citizen-suit statutes 
to the degree that the applicable substantive law of agency review 
already affords substantial deference on the merits. The result of this 
more objective standing inquiry would be litigation for the sake of 
shedding light on government conduct-a readily defensible democratic 
goal. 
II. THE STANDING PROBLEM: "LWANV. AKINS" 
The prevailing test for Article III standing, applied in Lujan, has long 
been the subject of ardent critique. Although numerous scholars have 
Massachusetts' interest in the outcome of this litigation" raises questions as to the future of standing 
doctrine in public law cases implicating so-called generalized grievances. Id. at 1455, 1456 
(majority opinion) (quoting Akins, 524 U.s. at 24). 
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proposed substitute standing tests, few have carefully examined the 
Supreme Court's own reworking of Lujan in the Akins case. 12 
Both Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife and FEe v. Akins were brought 
under express statutory provisions authorizing suit to challenge agency 
inaction. Although the Supreme Court purported to apply the identical 
standard for Article III standing in both, it reached precisely opposite 
results. This Part concludes that although Akins shifted the injury-in-fact 
paradigm from the facts relating to plaintiff to the statutory creation of 
injury, its inherent analytical conflict with Lujan has enabled the FEC to 
challenge anyone's standing to sue it under the FECA. As a result, Akins 
has been relitigated repeatedly, and whether Akins controls any plaintiffs 
standing has been called into question. Were courts to properly 
recognize that Akins and Lujan are not entirely reconcilable, redundant 
standing litigation under the FECA's citizen-suit provision would cease. 
A. The Prevailing Injury-in-Fact Test 
1. The Case-or-Controversy Requirement Encapsulated 
Standing jurisprudence contains two strands: Article III standing to 
sue, which enforces the Constitution's case-or-controversy 
requirement,13 and prudential standing, which embodies "judicially self-
imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction.,,14 The 
constitutional limitation on standing, unlike the prudential one, cannot be 
waived by parties or Congress. 15 Although the ban on "generalized 
grievances" originated as a prudential, or judge-made, limitation on 
standing,16 the Supreme Court has not consistently characterized the 
12. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 616 (stating that, "[r]emarkably, the emerging law 
governing standing to obtain information has yet to receive academic attention,"-a statement that 
largely applies today). But see William W. Buzbee, Standing and the Statutory Universe, II DUKE 
ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. 247, 262-63 (2001) (discussing the retreat from Lujan in Akins); Gene R. 
Nichol, The Impossibility of Lujan 's Project, II DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. 193, 197-98 (2001) 
(discussing standing analysis in Akins and Lujan). 
13. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (discussing federal court jurisdiction). 
14. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). Although the Court has not exhaustively 
defined the prudential dimensions of the standing doctrine, it has explained that prudential standing 
encompasses three elements: (I) "the general prohibition on a litigant's raising another person's 
legal rights," (2) "the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately 
addressed in the representative branches," and (3) "the requirement that a plaintiff's complaint fall 
within the zone of interests protected by the law invoked." Id. 
IS. See Gladstone, Realtors v. Vill. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, \00 (1979) (observing that, 
although Congress may legislatively override prudential standing limits, it may not abrogate Article 
III minima). 
16. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 490-91 (1975) (declaring that bar on citizen and 
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generalized grievance restriction as such; in Lujan, the plurality 
construed it as part-and-parcel of the case-or-controversy requirement, 17 
a nuance that has erupted in confusion post-Akins. 18 
Article III itself does not attempt to define "Case" or "Controversy" 
or provide any guidelines as to what sorts of disputes are appropriately 
resolved through the judicial process. As the Supreme Court has 
observed, "an executive inquiry can bear the name 'case' ... and a 
legislative dispute can bear the name 'controversy. ",19 According to 
James Madison's explanation at the Constitutional Convention, the 
language limits judicial review "to cases of a Judiciary Nature.,,2o 
Because "the Constitution's central mechanism of separation of powers 
depends largely upon common understanding of what activities are 
appropriate to legislatures, to executives, and to courts,,,21 by restricting 
the availability of judicial review, standing promotes separation of 
powers. Of course, whether something is "of a Judiciary Nature" or 
"appropriate" for judicial review begs the question of whether a dispute 
is justiciable under Article III. Translating the case-or-controversy 
requirement into a single workable standard of justiciability has thus 
been notoriously difficult for the Supreme Court. 
Historically, the Court analogized Article III standing to the common 
law by looking to whether the defendant's actions harmed a legal interest 
recognized at common law.22 Because the modem citizenry's 
relationship with the federal government and its administrative apparatus 
has no corollary under the common law system,23 this method had 
inherent limitations. The Supreme Court moved in the 1960s and early 
1970s toward the current standard by looking to whether the plaintiff has 
taxpayer suits was "prudential"). 
17. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 94 (4th ed. 2003) (discussing Lujan 
holding). 
18. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11,23 (\ 998) ("Whether styled as a constitutional or prudential 
limit on standing, the Court has sometimes determined that where large numbers of Americans 
suffer alike, the political process, rather than the judicial process, may provide the more appropriate 
remedy for a widely shared grievance." (citing cases)). 
19. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (\992). 
20. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Injury and the DiSintegration of Article Ill, 74 CAL. L. REv. 1915, 
1919 (\ 986) (quoting 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 430 (Max Ferrand 
ed., rev. ed. 1966». 
2\' Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559--60. 
22. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 68--69 (citing Tenn. Elec. Power Co. v. Tenn. Valley 
Auth., 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (\939)); Nichol, supra note 20, at 1920 (citing Joint Anti-Fascist 
Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 151-53 (\951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)). 
23. See Nichol, supra note 20, at 1920--21 (noting that the "[g]overnment owes substantial 
duties and obligations to its citizenry that have no clear counterparts in the common law system" and 
that "[I]iberalized judicial review of administrative decisionmaking also led to a fatal collision with 
the purely private rights model"). 
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a particular stake in the outcome of the litigation, regardless of the nature 
of the abstract claim.24 Justice Brennan explained in Baker v. Carr that 
"a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy ... assure[s] that 
concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon 
which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult 
constitutional questions.,,25 Whether a federal judge's authority is at its 
essence limited to resolving purely private disputes akin to those at 
common law remains a hotly disputed question that has shaped the 
Supreme Court's justiciability jurisprudence ever since. 
Although the first iterations of what is now known as the "injury-in-
fact" standard expanded plaintiffs' access to the federal courts by 
recognizing injuries well beyond the economic harm that was the 
cornerstone of the common law system,26 under Chief Justice Warren 
Burger, the Court reconfigured the standard to substantially narrow the 
range of justiciable claims by requiring that plaintiffs show that the 
injury is "distinct"-i.e., differentiated from the general populace-and 
"palpable" or "concrete," as opposed to speculative or hypothetical. 27 
The modem test requires that plaintiffs show (a) that they have suffered 
an "injury-in-fact" that was (b) caused by the defendant and that would 
(c) be redressable by a judgment in their favor as prerequisites to 
invoking the jurisdiction of an Article III court. 28 Moreover, "a plaintiff 
must demonstrate standing separately for each form of relief sought,,29 
and with the quantum of proof required at each stage of the litigation?O 
Two factors further complicate the injury-in-fact test in cases 
brought against a governmental entity. First, if the plaintiff himself is the 
24. See id. at 1921 & n.36 (citing Ass'n of Data Processing Servo Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 
150, 154 (1970)) (reviewing some examples of abstract interests that might, if harmed, establish 
injury, as provided by the Court in Data Processing). 
25. 369 U.S. 186,204 (1962). See generally Daniel Patrick Condon, Note, The Generalized 
Grievance Restriction: Prudential Restraint or Constitutional Mandate?, 70 GEO. L.J. 1157, 1164-
65 ( 1982) (discussing !be purpose of the personal stake requirement). 
26. Nichol, supra note 20, at 1921. 
27. See id. at 1923 ("[T]he injury standard demands harm that is 'distinct and palpable.'" 
(quoting Warth V. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, SOl (1975))). 
28. Lujan V. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). The standing requirements 
for suing in state courts may vary significantly. See ROGER BEERS, STANDING AND RIGHTS OF 
ACTION IN ENVIRONMENTAL LITIGATION 5 (ALI-ABA Coursebook Paper, 2005), available at 
SK094 ALI-ABA (Westlaw) (discussing cases). 
29. Friends of the Earth, Inc. V. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 185 (2000). 
30. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561. Thus, "[a]t the pleading stage, general factual allegations of injury 
resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice," but "[i]n response to a summary judgment 
motion, ... the plaintiff can no longer rest on such 'mere allegations,' but must 'set forth' by 
affidavit or other evidence 'specific facts. '" ld. (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)). At the final stage, 
controverted facts "must be 'supported adequately by the evidence adduced at trial. '" ld. (quoting 
Gladstone, Realtors V. ViiI. of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91,115 n.31 (1979)). 
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subject of the government action, it is usually clear that he has been 
injured and that a favorable judgment will redress the injury.3l If the 
asserted injury stems from the government's regulation or lack of 
regulation of someone else, by contrast, "much more is needed.,,32 
Second, a handful of federal statutes-primarily those governing federal 
environmental law-expressly confer standing on "any person," 
"citizen," or "party" to challenge agency actions?3 Although technically 
a plaintiff must independently satisfy the Lujan standard in cases brought 
pursuant to such statutes, citizen-suit provisions complicate the standing 
analysis by provoking the ban on generalized grievances. They represent 
a congressional determination to empower citizens to bring about a 
change in the way the Executive is enforcing the law. But in theory if 
injury-in-fact is truly a constitutional mandate, Congress has no power to 
endow the citizenry with standing to sue the FEC to prompt it to take 
enforcement action against a third party. Citizen-suit statutes thus 
highlight an inherent tension between the particularized injury 
requirement and standing to sue in many public law cases, a tension that 
is readily apparent in analyzing the various opinions in Lujan and Akins. 
2. Lujan and Statutory Standing 
Lujan involved a nonprofit organization's challenge to a rule 
promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior that interpreted the 
Endangered Species Act (ESA)34 so as to render the statute inapplicable 
to government actions taken abroad.35 The ESA instructs the Secretary 
to promulgate by regulation a list of threatened species and to define 
their critical habitats. 36 It then requires that each federal agency, "in 
consultation with and with the assistance of the Secretary, insure that any 
action authorized, funded, or carried out by such agency ... is not likely 
31. Jd. at 561-62. 
32. Jd. at 562. 
33. E.g., Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(A) (2000); Toxic 
Substances Control Act § 119, 15 U.S.c. § 2619(a) (2000); Endangered Species Act § II, 16 U.S.c. 
§ I 540(g) (2000); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act § 520,30 U.S.C. § 1270(a) (2000); 
Federal Water Pollution Control Act § 505, 33 U.S.c. § 1365(a) (2000); Deepwater Port Act, 33 
U.S.C. § 1515(a) (2000); Safe Water Drinking Act § 1449,42 U.S.C. § 300j-8 (2000); Noise Control 
Act § 12,42 U.S.c. § 4911(a) (2000); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act § 702,42 U.S.c. § 
6972(a) (2000); Clean Air Act § 304, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2000); Outer Continental Shelf Lands 
Act, 43 U.S.c. § 1349(a) (2000). The bulk of citizen-suit statutes appear in environmental 
legislation. See BEERS, supra note 28, at 2 ("[M]ost environmental statutes or amendments enacted 
after the Clean Air Act in 1970 contain such citizen suit provisions. "). 
34. 87 Stat. 884 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.c. §§ 1531-1544 (2000)). 
35. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 557-58. 
36. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1533, 1536. 
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to jeopardize the continued existence" of those species or their habitats. 37 
In 1978, the Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries 
Service promulgated a regulation extending these obligations to actions 
taken in foreign nations, but proposed a revised regulation in 1983 that 
required only consultation for actions taken in the United States or on the 
high seas.38 
The ESA contains a citizen-suit provision, which provides in 
pertinent part that "any person may commence a civil suit on his own 
behalf ... to enjoin any person ... who is alleged to be in violation of 
any provision of this chapter.,,39 A group of organizations devoted to 
environmental causes sued the Secretary, seeking a declaratory judgment 
that the new regulation was erroneous and an injunction requiring 
reinstatement of the old one.40 The Supreme Court held that the plaintiff 
groups lacked standing because they failed to show that any members 
were individually harmed with sufficient particularity or imminence.41 
"By particularized," Justice Scalia wrote for the majority, "we mean that 
the injury must affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.,,42 
In an attempt to link the environmental threat to an actual 
personalized stake or interest in the judgment sought, the plaintiffs 
claimed that the agencies' lack of consultation regarding activities 
abroad increased the rate of extinction of endangered and threatened 
species, and that members of the plaintiff organizations had traveled to 
Egypt and Sri Lanka and observed endangered species in their traditional 
habitats, and intended to retum.43 The plaintiffs' alleged injury was thus 
grounded in a procedural right created by virtue of the statute's 
requirement that agencies entrusted with the ESA's enforcement consult 
with each other regarding the impact of their actions on threatened 
species or habitats.44 The Court found it not cognizable irrespective of 
the statute's citizen-suit provision because the plaintiffs could not show 
how damage to the species injured them personally.45 They produced no 
37. Id. § 1536(a)(2). 
38. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558-59 (citations omitted). 
39. 16 u.s.c. § I 540(g)(2000). 
40. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 559. 
41. Id. at 564. 
42. Id. at 560 n.l. As noted previously, this requirement dovetails with the prudential 
limitation on standing that precludes individual lawsuits to avenge "generalized grievances" shared 
by the populace as a whole. 
43. Id. at 562-64 (quotations and citations omitted). 
44. Id. at 562-63. 
45. Id. at 563. 
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concrete plans to visit the habitats in the future. 46 Although the ESA 
required interagency consultation and empowered citizens to sue for its 
enforcement, the Lujan Court flatly rejected the notion "that the injury-
in-fact requirement had been satisfied by congressional conferral upon 
all persons of an abstract, self-contained, non instrumental 'right' to have 
the Executive observe the procedures required by law.,,47 The Court 
acknowledged that individuals can enforce procedural rights, but only if 
the procedures were "designed to protect some threatened concrete 
interest" of theirs that would independently give rise to standing.48 Thus, 
the inquiry circled back to particularized injury, regardless of the "right" 
to a particular procedure created by statute.49 
Although the Supreme Court had previously recognized 
congressional power to create justiciable statutory rights even if no 
cognizable injury existed prelegislation,50 Lujan defeats the notion that 
Congress can legislate self-executing standing to the citizenry overall to 
vindicate such rights. Congress can only go so far, in other words, in 
exercising its settled authority to create justiciable statutory "rights" and 
in enhancing the justiciability of those rights with attendant citizen-suit 
prOVISIOns. 
A plurality of the Court further concluded that the Lujan plaintiffs 
failed to satisfy the causation and redressability prongs. Justice Scalia 
deemed challenges to government programs, even if premised on 
violations of federal law, "'rarely if ever appropriate for federal-court 
adjudication. ",51 Because the funding agencies were not parties to the 
suit, whether a judgment against the Secretary would redress the alleged 
injury was "entirely conjectural.,,52 
Thus, while Lujan stands for the proposition that Congress cannot 
legislatively override the constitutional injury-in-fact requirement to 
46. Id. at 564. 
47. Id. at 573. 
48. Id. at 573 n.8; see also Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26,41 n.22 (1976) 
("When Congress has so acted, the requirements of Art. III remain: '(T)he plaintiff still must allege a 
distinct and palpable injury to himself, even if it is an injury shared by a large class of other possible 
litigants. ", (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975))). 
49. Although there is arguably a distinction between abstract procedural rights and the right to 
information in that the latter produces a concrete, tangible commodity, the Akins Court found that 
the plaintiffs' injury lay in the "inability to obtain information," not in the void created by the 
absence of the information at issue. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11,21 (1998). 
50. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 70 (discussing Trafficante v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 409 
U.S. 205 (1972)). 
51. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 568 (plurality opinion) (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759-60 
(1984)). 
52. Id. at 568, 571. 
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enable citizens to challenge government programs, the plurality indicated 
that causation and redressability are defeated whenever the actions of 
third parties could hypothetically interfere with the plaintiffs ability to 
achieve precise redress of the individualized relief alleged (if any) in 
administrative cases. The implications of Lujan practically translate into 
a ban on any suit against a government agency that does not involve 
clean challenges to regulatory activity by the regulated. In the latter 
circumstance, the case can easily be made that the government regulator 
directly caused the injury alleged by the regulated party. In more 
attenuated cases, such as those in which plaintiffs seek Executive 
enforcement of the campaign finance laws, the ultimate target is not even 
a party to the action; strict redressability, therefore, is utterly illusory. 
3. The Failures ofInjury-in-Fact 
The Supreme Court's attempt to fashion a bright-line test that keeps 
federal judges from improperly usurping the Executive authority is 
laudable. The case-or-controversy language surely implies that 
something short of a political dispute must exist before the judiciary can 
be involved. 53 Whether the injury-in-fact test effectively keeps courts 
from adjudicating noncases or noncontroversies within the meaning of 
Article III, however, is less evident. The Court has observed that the test 
"in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiffs contention,,,54 thus 
appearing to have assumed that it is sufficiently divorced from the merits 
to foster objectivity uninfluenced by a judge's political persuasions or the 
"sexiness" of the case.55 Yet the test's susceptibility to whim and 
subjectivity is perhaps the loudest complaint lodged against it. 
Joined by Justice O'Connor, Justice Blackmun dissented in Lujan 
because the facts submitted raised at least a "genuine issue" as to 
whether the plaintiff organizations' members would return to the sites 
abroad as averred in their affidavits, which is all that the summary 
judgment standard of Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 requires; the dissent thus 
questioned the plurality's requirement of "concrete plans" as "empty 
formality.,,56 Nothing prevented the affiants from "simply purchasing 
53. Cj Nichol, supra note 20, at 1923 ("The Court's goals ... are both ascertainable and ... 
laudable."). 
54. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). 
55. See Nichol, supra note 20, at 1923-24 (discussing the "line of demarcation between the 
presentation of 'cases' and the mere airing of political disagreements"). 
56. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 592 (Blackmun, 1., dissenting). 
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plane tickets.,,57 Justice Blackmun "fear[ed] the Court's demand for 
detailed descriptions of future conduct will do little to weed out those 
who are genuinely harmed from those who are not," and require "more 
and more particularized showings of future harm.,,58 
The concerns Justice Blackmun outlined were not idle. Requiring 
the judiciary to employ a standing inquiry that depends on an ultimately 
subjective analysis of how much harm is enough harm yields more-not 
less-power for unelected judges. As the varying opinions in Lujan 
itself demonstrate, the injury-in-fact test enables judges to resolve 
debates over whether affidavits are sufficiently detailed in wildly 
disparate ways that may be equally legitimate under its three prongs. As 
a result, case law under Lujan is fraught with inconsistencies. 59 The 
injury-in-fact test tolerates the outcome-determinative standing 
adjudication that it was designed to avoid, all the while bearing no 
transparent correlation to the strength of the claim on the merits. A judge 
could require a more particularized showing of harm if she prefers to 
dismiss the case, and accept a vague showing if she wishes to reach the 
merits. Hypothetically, too, injury-in-fact can easily be overcome by 
recruiting "injured" plaintiffs to join a political organization's complaint 
simply for purposes of surviving what would otherwise be a difficult 
standing challenge to an overly broad attack on a government program.60 
The Supreme Court has rejected a quantitative test for injury,6! so the test 
is both underinclusive (excluding legitimate claims based on pleading 
technicalities) and potentially overinclusive. 
57. Id. 
58. Id. at 593. 
59. See generally Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Standing Jor Privilege: The Failure oj Injury Analysis, 
82 B.U. L. REV. 301 (2002) (discussing how standing law is inconsistent). Many have taken the 
view that "as a body oflaw, the standing doctrine has failed," id. at 304, both because the standard is 
inherently flawed and inflexible by design, and because the Supreme Court has interpreted its 
creation too restrictively. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review oj Agency Inaction: An 
Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1671 (2004) (explaining the disappointment due 
to the Supreme Court's restrictive interpretation of the injury-in-fact requirement). 
60. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 62 (describing how, after the Supreme Court 
determined in Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972), that the Sierra Club lacked standing to 
sue to prevent the construction of a ski resort because there was no allegation that its members had 
used the area where the resort was to be constructed, Justice White is quoted as saying, '''Why didn't 
the Sierra Club have one goddamn member walk through the park and then there would have been 
standing to sue?'''; the plaintiffs amended their complaint accordingly on remand (quoting BOB 
WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN 164 n* (1979»). 
61. Steven G. Davison, Standing to Sue in Citizen Suits Against Air and Water Polluters Under 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), Inc., 17 TuL. ENVTL. L.J. 63, 
66 & n.21 (2003) (citing United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures, 412 
U.S. 669, 689 n.14 (\973». 
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Proposed alternatives to the injury-in-fact standard range from a 
straightforward merits test62 to a redefinition of injury to recognize 
subcategories of cognizable interests63 to, perhaps most prominently, a 
purely statutory inquiry hinging on congressional intent.64 Others have 
challenged these critiques by attempting to unearth' the historical 
underpinnings of the Constitution's case-or-controversy requirement, 
arguing that the Framers envisioned the federal courts as places for 
hearing actual and distinctly personal grievances, and that Lujan properly 
(if not clumsily) aims to cabin their role in our structure of government.65 
Whether Congress can legislate standing to sue has been at the heart 
of this dialogue.66 Nowhere is this question more salient than where 
review of government action is concerned. We live in an era of 
extraordinary tension regarding the powers of Congress vis-a-vis the 
autonomy of the Executive Branch. Whether private citizens can invoke 
the jurisdiction of the third branch of government, at Congress's behest, 
to review Executive action is a question with everyday implications. It is 
particularly salient in the area of campaign finance and election reform, 
which many view as striking at the heart of democracy itself. Because it 
provides that Congress can endow citizens with standing to sue the FEC 
to prompt it to enforce the law, the Supreme Court's decision in FEe v. 
Akins67 is of greater import than has been recognized. 
62. See William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE LJ. 221, 234 (1988) (stating 
that "standing is a jurisdictional question, involving a preliminaI)' look at the merits"). 
63. See Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Rethinking Standing, 72 CAL. L. REv. 68, 89 (1984) (stating three 
ways an interest cognizable by law can be created); see also Nichol, supra note 20, at 1942-43 
(arguing that injury should take into account the cognizability of the underlying interest in addition 
to the actuality of the hann). 
64. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 616-17 (noting "the question of standing is for 
congressional rather than judicial resolution"). 
65. See generally James Leonard & Joanne C. Brant, The Half-Open Door: Article III, the 
Injury-in-Fact Rule, and the Framers' Plan for Federal Courts of Limited Jurisdiction, 54 RUTGERS 
L. REv. I (2001) (reviewing the evolution of the injuI)'-in-fact requirement and arguing that it 
reflects the Framers' views); Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing 
Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REv. 689 (2004) (arguing that historically cases saw a "constitutional 
dimension to standing doctrine"). 
66. Justice Scalia framed the same question as "whether the public interest ... in agencies' 
observance of a particular, statutorily prescribed procedure can be converted into an individual right 
by a statute that denominates it as such, and that pennits all citizens ... to sue." Lujan v. Defenders 
of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576-77 (1992) (punctuation omitted). 
67. 524 U.S. II (1998). 
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B. Informational Injury and FEC v. Akins 
Akins addressed the question of whether individual voters' 
challenges to the FEC's refusal to take enforcement action against 
someone else presented a case or controversy within the meaning of 
Article III. In finding standing, the Court drew three conclusions in 
derogation of Lujan. First, it indicated that Congress can create a 
statutory "right" that the populace can enforce in court by sheer 
operation of the statute. Second, it lifted the ban on Article III courts' 
adjudication of grievances that are widely shared so long as the harm 
itself is not "abstract." And, third, it diluted the causation and 
redressability requirements beyond reasonable recognition. Yet the full 
implications of Akins have only marginally been explored.68 
Akins arose from the Commission's determination that the American 
Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) is not a "political committee" 
as defined by the FECA and its refusal to require AlP AC to make 
disclosures required under the Act. 69 A group of voters that opposed 
AIPAC's views filed a complaint with the FEC alleging that AIPAC was 
a political committee that failed to comply with the FECA's disclosure 
requirements. It asked the FEC to force AlP AC to release information 
required of political committees.7o 
68. See also Nichol, supra note 59, at 336 ("[I]n Federal Election Commission v. Akins, the 
Court backed away from Lujan's premises. In Akins, the Court easily recognized a statutory grant of 
standing even though some Justices would have regarded the informational claim asserted as a 
generalized grievance."); cf Trevor W. Morrison, Private Attorneys General and the First 
Amendment, 103 MICH. L. REv. 589,624 n.158 (2005) ("Applied broadly, this approach might seem 
to signal a repudiation of Lujan's conception of 'injury in fact. "'). 
69. As the Supreme Court explained in Akins, "the FECA seeks to remedy any actual or 
perceived corruption of the political process in several important ways." 524 U.S. at 14. The FECA 
prohibits corporations from making contributions or expenditures in connection with elections to any 
political office, including primary elections. 2 U.S.C. § 441b(a) (2000). It imposes limits on the 
amounts individuals and entities qualifYing as "political committees" under the Act can contribute or 
spend in coordination with a candidate for federal political office. [d. §§ 441a(a)-(b), 44lb. A 
"political committee" includes "any committee, club, association or other group of persons" which 
receives more than $\000 in "contributions" or makes more than $\000 in "expenditures" in any 
given year, 2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A) (2000), "for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal 
office," id. § 431(8)(A)(i), (9)(A)(i). Political committees must register with the Commission, 
appoint a treasurer, maintain information regarding contributors, track disbursements, and file 
periodic reports setting forth this and other information in great detail. [d. §§ 432-434. 
70. Akins, 524 U.S. at 15-16. The FEC concluded that A1PAC's communications did count as 
"expenditures" for purposes of the FECA's definition of "political committee," but nonetheless 
exempted AIPAC from its requirements and dismissed the voters' complaint. [d. at 17-18,29. The 
district court and the D.C. Circuit ultimately reached the merits, finding that the FEC misinterpreted 
the statute's definition of "political committee." See Akins v. FEC, 101 F.3d 731,744 (D.C. Cir. 
1996) (en banc) (finding that the FEC's decision to dismiss appellant's complaint was "based on its 
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In finding that the plaintiffs had standing to sue the FEC for refusing 
to take enforcement action against AIPAC, Justice Breyer, writing for the 
majority, unambiguously recognized Congress's power to define 
constitutional standing:71 "[T]he informational injury at issue here, 
directly related to voting, the most basic of political rights, is sufficiently 
concrete and specific" so as not to "deprive Congress of constitutional 
power to authorize its vindication in the federal courts."n Because the 
FECA required the disclosure of information, the deprivation of such 
information established standing.73 This holding presupposes that 
Congress is empowered to legislate an "injury" previously unknown to 
the law. The Court rejected the FEC's argument "that Congress lacks the 
constitutional power to authorize federal courts to adjudicate this 
lawsuit.,,74 
The Akins approach to congressional power to define justiciability 
stands in stark contrast with that reflected in Lujan, which hinged 
standing analysis on the individual's private injury as distinct from the 
statutory terms that gave rise to the injury.75 In Lujan, Justice Scalia 
made clear that "[i]t makes no difference" what Congress attempts to do 
by way of legislation when it comes to Article III standing-the 
Constitution always requires injury-in-fact.76 The Akins majority, by 
contrast, based its standing inquiry on the purpose of the FECA's 
enforcement provision, and refused to accept the proposition-implicit in 
mistaken interpretation of § 43 1 (4)(A)"), rev 'd on other grounds, 524 U.S. 11 (1998). 
71. Justice Breyer observed that the prudential standing element is satisfied because Congress 
empowered "'[a]ny party aggrieved'" by the FEC's dismissal of an administrative complaint or its 
failure to timely act on such a complaint to sue in district court. Akins, 524 U.S. at 19 (quoting § 
437g(a)(8)(A) (2000)) (alteration in original). Justice Breyer construed this language as evincing "a 
congressional intent to cast the standing net broadly." Id. at 19-20 (citing the Administrative 
Procedure Act which states that "those 'suffering legal wrong' or 'adversely affected or aggrieved .. 
. within the meaning of a relevant statute' may seek judicial review of agency action"); Buckley v. 
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,66-67 (1976). Courts have interpreted the Akins Court's characterization of the 
"aggrieved party" language as holding that Congress waives all prudential limitations on standing 
except for the "zone of interest" test when it grants "aggrieved" parties the right to sue. See, e.g., 
Bangura v. Hansen, 434 F.3d 487, 499 (6th Cir. 2006) (discussing the application of the "zone of 
interest test" as it applies to parties with standing to sue). 
72. Akins, 524 U.S. at 24-25. 
73. Id. at 25. 
74. Id. at 20. 
75. See Nichol, supra note 59, at 334 (arguing that the Court's "effort to make the injury 
requirement a principal determinant" of the federal courts' limited role in our government has "not 
succeeded," and that the opinions are "inconsistent and contradictory"). 
76. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 566 (1992) ("[I]t makes no difference 
that the general-purpose section of the ESA states that the Act was intended in part 'to provide a 
means whereby the ecosystems upon which endangered species and threatened species depend may 
be conserved."') (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1531(b) (1990)). 
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the FEC's arguments and Justice Scalia's dissent-that the statute itself 
is ultra vires. 
Whereas the Lujan plurality rejected the plaintiffs' argument that 
they suffered a generalized but justiciable "procedural injury" under the 
ESA's citizen-suit provisions,77 the Akins Court again diverted from 
Lujan by defeating the FEC's contention that the voters raised only a 
"'generalized grievance. ",78 The fact that informational injury inflicted 
on voters "is widely shared [does] not deprive Congress of constitutional 
power to authorize its vindication in the federal courtS.,,79 The Court 
distinguished harms of "an abstract and indefinite nature," such as 
"injury to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed.,,80 
The Akins Court thus sketched out some sort of compromise between 
a purely ideological injury that is not cognizable and one that, though 
widely shared, is something more concrete than pure ideology, albeit not 
particularized. At both poles, the grievance is "generalized" in the sense 
that many people share it, so the constitutional objection under Akins lies 
in the nature of the injury.8l Pure distaste in government activity 
presumably still has a uniquely political solution post-Akins. Short of 
that, Congress can define "injuries" that are cognizable notwithstanding 
that the public as a whole suffers them. The Article III injury 
requirement is satisfied so long as the plaintiff identifies injury-
potentially any injury-to an express statutory "right.,,82 And in the 
FECA, Congress created just such a nonabstract injury in establishing a 
right to third-party information. The breadth of the citizen-suit provision 
expressly allowing for standing to vindicate such statutory injury, 
moreover, waives any prudential objections that might remain regarding 
citizen standing.83 
Notably, Akins did not superimpose Lujan on FECA standing by 
erecting what could have been a two-tiered injury standard, whereby a 
complainant must prove both that it was denied access to information 
and that such denial injured a live and specific interest in some 
additional way (by, for example, making it difficult for a voter to 
77. Id. at 573-74. 
78. Akins, 524 U.S. at 23. 
79. !d. at 25. 
80. Jd. at 23-24. 
81. See I LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 424 (3d ed. 2000) ("But a 
court ... should not close its eyes to the nature of the substantive right asserted and should not forget 
to inquire whether the nature of the particular injury, however widely inflicted, is such as to impede 
the effective operation of majoritarian processes. "). 
82. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 72. 
83. See supra notes 14, 71 and accompanying text. 
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evaluate a particular candidate implicated by the information in a 
particular election).84 This is perhaps where the greatest 
misunderstanding of the Akins holding lies. Courts and the FEC's 
lawyers have added a layer of analysis on Akins that would require a 
showing that a widely shared lack of FECA information also causes a 
distinct, albeit related, harm to the plaintiff.85 This is an understandable 
attempt to harmonize Lujan's particularized injury requirement with 
Akins, particularly as Lujan conflated the prudential ban on generalized 
grievances (which Congress inherently waived with a citizen-suit 
provision) with the Article III minima. But it is inconsistent with the 
holding of Akins itself. Although the Court noted that there was "no 
reason to doubt" that the information sought by AlP AC would be useful 
to it,86 this comment was dicta and not integral to its finding of 
constitutional standing. 
The third and most prominent way in which Akins conflicted with 
Lujan was its treatment of causation and redressability. AIPAC easily 
cleared the hurdle that Justice Scalia described as "[t]he most obvious 
problem" with Lujan.87 Lujan established that a greater showing of 
injury is needed when a plaintiff sues to prompt government regulation 
of someone else.88 Under such circumstances, causation and 
redressability '''depend[] on the unfettered choices made by independent 
actors not before the courts. ",89 Under Lujan, such plaintiffs must 
"adduce facts showing that those choices have been or will be made in 
such manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of 
injury.,,9o In other words, plaintiffs must be prepared to establish "facts" 
as to the occurrence of future events. 
Akins presented the third-party scenario outlined in Lujan, with 
opposite results. The Court was satisfied that the injury was redressable 
even though the FEC was not in actual possession of the information 
sought by AIPAC and thereby tolerated the inevitably speculative 
causation and redressability showing that would otherwise constrain 
plaintiffs seeking to spur regulation of a third party. Although the FEC 
remained at leisure to "decide[] in the exercise of its discretion not to 
require AIPAC to produce the information," this unknown did not defeat 
84. Cf Akins, 524 U.S. at 21 (musing that "[t]here is no reason to doubt [the respondents'] 
claim that the information would help them ... in a specific election"). 
85. See infra notes 99-123 and accompanying text. 
86. Akins, 524 U.S. at 21. 
87. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 568, 571 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
88. Id. at 562 (majority opinion). 
89. Id. (quoting ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605,615 (1989) (plurality opinion)). 
90. Id. (emphasis added). 
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Article III causation.91 The Court found that causation and redressability 
were satisfied by the mere fact that a reviewing court was empowered to 
"set aside the agency's action and remand the case.,,92 Taken to its 
logical extreme, this finding would render causation and redressability 
per se satisfied in all administrative cases. The fact that AlP AC was not 
a party to the case but could conceivably take actions to frustrate 
redressability did not even factor into the Court's analysis. 
At bottom, what the Akins Court refused to do under the auspices of 
Article III standing was render the FECA enforcement provision a 
nullity. Although well-established precedent generally precludes judicial 
review of Executive decisions not to enforce a statute,93 the Akins Court 
distinguished the FECA as a statute that "explicitly indicates the 
contrary.,,94 In his Akins dissent, consequently, Justice Scalia predictably 
assailed "[t]he provision of law at issue in this case [a]s an extraordinary 
one," because it empowers private parties to compel an agency to 
regulate a third party.95 By making clear that it was not willing to 
entertain a challenge to the "provision of law" itself, the Akins majority 
grounded its standing decision in the language of that law instead of the 
facts peculiar to the individual plaintiffs before it. In doing so, it 
elevated Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Lujan, in which he reiterated 
that Congress is empowered to define injuries that give rise to a cause of 
action that did not exist at common law.96 
Thus, whereas Akins focused on the terms of the statute on the theory 
that Congress can legislate standing by creating a "right" to information 
91. Akins, 524 U.S. at 25 (citing Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 
402,410 (1971); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967)). 
92. Id. 
93. See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) ("This Court has recognized on several 
occasions over many years that an agency's decision not to prosecute or enforce, whether through 
civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency's absolute discretion. "). 
94. Akins, 524 U.S. at 26. 
95. Id. at 29-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). 
96. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring); see 
also Morrison, supra note 68, at 624 n.158 ("Arguably, ... Akins may signal a shift in the direction 
of Justice Kennedy's concurring opinion in Lujan, which did not go so far as to say that assessing 
individualized 'injury in fact' is an entirely pre-legal exercise, but instead simply stressed that 
Congress must speak clearly and carefully when creating enforceable legal rights .... "). 
Lujan was one of several cases in the mid-to-Iate 1980s that halted a "move toward 
liberalization of standing," that had begun in the 1960s and had had a "net effect of . . . 
transform[ing] the APA standing provisions from a screen against bystander suits into an open 
sieve." Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1039, \077, 1076 (1997). That is, prior to the Lujan line of cases, a plaintiff did not "have to show 
injury to a common law right or the existence of a special legislatively created cause of action. It 
was enough to show some connection to the government decision being challenged and to make 
arguments bearing some relationship to a federal regulatory scheme." Id. 
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that is enforceable by the public at large, Lujan denied standing 
notwithstanding the language and purpose of the ESA because the facts 
relating to the individual plaintiff failed to demonstrate imminent, 
particularized harm that would be redressed by the declaratory judgment 
and injunction sought.97 Because Lujan remains a leading case on 
standing, courts have strained to harmonize the two cases, an effort 
which has led to confusing standing jurisprudence and more litigation.98 
Courts should instead acknowledge that Akins substantially departed 
from Lujan, and focus on determining which line of authority to apply in 
non-FECA cases. 
C. Relitigation of Akins 
What Justice Blackmun expressed as rhetorical disbelief in his Lujan 
dissent-that Lujan standing analysis would enable the Executive Branch 
to simply ignore the Supreme Court's construction of a governing 
statute99 -has emerged in FECA standing litigation under Akins. By 
rigidly relying on the Lujan analysis, the FEC has succeeded in muddling 
the clear holding of Akins so as to force courts to "decide" the issues the 
Supreme Court already resolved in Akins. 100 Not only does the 
Commission's defensive strategy misdirect resources, it necessitates 
complex standing litigation that is expensive for private parties to 
undertake. As a result, relitigation of Akins operates as a barrier to 
97. Before either Lujan or Akins, the Supreme Court, in United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 
166 (1974), dismissed on standing grounds a taxpayer suit challenging the Government's failure to 
disclose the expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency. Id. at 170. Just as Justice Scalia relied 
on Richardson in his Lujan opinion, Lujan, 504 U.S. at 575, he discussed it at length in his Akins 
dissent, 524 U.S. at 31-36 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Richardson plaintiffs alleged that the agency 
violated the constitutional requirement that '''a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and 
Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.'" 418 U.S. at 167--68 (citing 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7). Justice Scalia explained in Akins that the Richardson plaintiffs' 
'''aggrievement' was precisely the 'aggrievement' [asserted in Akins]: the Government's unlawful 
refusal to place information within the public domain." Akins, 524 U.S. at 32 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
Indeed, the Richardson injury was even less tenuous, as the government was in actual possession of 
the information sought. The Court found such a claim a nonjusticiable "generalized grievance" 
because "the impact on [the plaintiff] is plainly undifferentiated and 'common to all members of the 
public.'" Richardson, 418 U.S. at 176-77. Because the showing of actual individual harm flowing 
from the deprivation of the information found lacking was simply not required by the Akins Court, 
Richardson would have come out differently under Akins. 
98. See infra Part Il.C. 
99. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 605 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
100. See Morrison, supra note 68, at 624 n.158 (citing McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 228-29 
(2003); Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 180-81 
(2000)) ("Akins did not overrule Lujan, and subsequent decisions have continued to cite Lujan as 
binding authority. "). 
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reaching merits review of certain FEC decision making that the citizen-
suit provision expressly opens to scrutiny. 
The trouble the Akins Court created by failing to repudiate Lujan is 
exemplified in a pair of cases, Buchanan v. FEC101 and Natural Law 
Party of the United States v. FEC. 102 Both were actions brought by third-
party presidential candidates challenging the FEC's dismissal of 
administrative complaints alleging improprieties by the Committee on 
Presidential Debates (CPO) in connection with the 1996 election. l03 The 
FEC argued that because the elections were over by the time it dismissed 
the administrative complaints, no live injuries existed and the courts 
were powerless to redress past harm. l04 The Commission essentially 
took the position that injury-in-fact is categorically impossible to satisfy 
in FECA cases because, as a practical matter, elections are short-lived. 
The nine-month election cycle makes it difficult to prove "'imminent' 
injury" at the time the complaint is filed in federal court, the argument 
went, leaving voters and defeated candidates susceptible to critique that 
the injuries alleged are either '''some day' intentions" or '" [p ]ast 
exposure to illegal conduct'" that do not suffice to establish injury-in-fact 
under Lujan. 105 
Both courts denied the FEC's motions to dismiss for lack of 
standing, and ultimately identified the problem-implicit in the majority 
decision in Akins, and in Justice Scalia's dissent-that the Akins majority 
attempted to avoid: that "the acceptance of the FEC's overly narrow 
construction of 'injury in fact' would be tantamount to shielding from 
judicial review many, if not all, election cases,,,106 thus "read[ing] 
FECA's judicial review provision out of the statute without any 
constitutionally sound rationale.,,107 But in both cases, it took carefully 
101. 112 F. Supp. 2d 58 (D.D.C. 2000). 
102. III F. Supp. 2d 33 (D.D.C. 2000); see also Becker v. FEC, 230 F.3d 381, 383 (1st CiT. 
2000) (involving challenge of FEC debate regulations allowing corporate funding of certain debate-
staging organizations). 
103. As the Buchanan court explained, "[t]he CPD is a private, non-profit corporation formed by 
the two major parties in 1987 for the purpose of sponsoring presidential debates." 112 F. Supp. 2d at 
61. It staged presidential debates leading up to the 1996 election imd others before it. Id. 
104. Natural Law Party, III F. Supp. 2d at 42. 
105. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,564 (1992). 
106. Natural Law Party, III F. Supp. 2d at 42. The FEC did not argue that the plaintiffs lacked 
prudential standing in any of these cases, which appears to be the only point it took well from the 
Akins decision. See, e.g., Buchanan, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 65 n.6 ("The FEC does not challenge 
plaintiffs' prudential standing to bring this case because it is clear that candidates, political parties, 
and voters are within the 'zone of interests' protected by FECA."); Natural Law Party, III F. Supp. 
2d at 43 ("Defendant does not argue that plaintiffs lack prudential standing, and, indeed, plaintiffs' 
claims would seem to fall squarely within the 'zone of interests' to be protected by the FECA."). 
107. Buchanan, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 69. 
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rendered decisions following costly litigation for the district courts 
simply to reach the conclusion that Akins says what it says. 
If the FEC's circular standing analysis was correct, the Akins 
plaintiffs would certainly have had no standing. In Akins itself, AlP AC 
was alleged to have helped defeat one of the Akins plaintiffs, Paul 
Findley, in the 1982 congressional election. 108 The administrative 
complaint, filed in 1989, claimed that AIPAC had made illegal campaign 
contributions 109 with respect to elections (one must presume) that 
occurred in the past. IIO Neither the historical nature of the alleged 
election-related injury nor the time-lag between election and enforcement 
activity factored into the Supreme Court's standing inquiry. Still, the 
Buchanan and Natural Law Party courts felt compelled to undertake a 
detailed rebuttal of several pre-Akins cases relied upon by the FECI I I to 
argue not only that the alleged injury was insufficiently "'concrete and 
particularized, '" but that it was "'conjectural or hypothetical '" within the 
meaning of the tripartite Lujan test. ll2 The FEC's argument created a 
double-bind: a FECA plaintiffs harm is either too stale or too 
speculative, rendering FEC nonenforcement decisions largely 
unreviewable despite the citizen-suit provision of the FECA itself. 
The FEC took on Akins again in Kean for Congress Committee v. 
FEC I13 after it was challenged for dismissing a defeated congressional 
candidate committee's administrative complaint alleging that the Council 
for Responsible Government (CRG) violated numerous FECA 
prohibitions in connection with its advertisements against the candidate, 
Tom Kean, Jr., in advance of the 2000 election. 114 The FEC moved to 
dismiss, arguing that standing was lacking because the Kean Committee 
failed to prove that Kean would run for office again,115 and accused the 
plaintiff of taking "a 'radical position'" in basing its standing on the 
FECA. 116 The Commission argued that the lack of FECA-related 
information, without more, was an insufficient injury under Lujan-even 
though it was squarely satisfied in Akins-because the plaintiff did not 
108. Akins v. FEC, 101 F.3d 731, 734 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev'd on other grounds, 524 
U.S. II (1998). 
109. Id. 
110. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (suggesting we '''presum[e] that general allegations embrace 
those specific facts that are necessary to support the claim '''). 
III. Natural Law Party, III F. Supp. 2d at 43-45. 
112. See Buchanan, 112 F. Supp. 2d at 62 (citing requirements of Lujan test). 
113. 398 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2005). The author represented the plaintiff in that action. 
114. ld. at 27-28, 35. 
115. ld. at 35-36. 
116. ld. at 36 (quoting Def. Reply at 6-8). 
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produce evidence to show particularized political injury to an active 
candidate for office. The district court found that the FEC's argument 
"misconstrues the holding of Akins," which found injury-in-fact because 
the plaintiff sought information under the FECA.ll7 As in Akins, then, to 
deny standing in Kean would have been to nullify the enforcement 
provisions of the Act. 
Courts continue to adjudicate the core holding of Akins in FECA 
informational suits, and the confusion Akins created by glossing over the 
injury-in-fact standard has made mischief in other contexts. Courts 
struggle with the question whether some additional injury beyond mere 
deprivation of information is necessary to satisfy Article III standing in 
non-FECA cases involving a statutory right to information. A few have 
distinguished the holding of Akins as "narrowly focused upon the widely 
held fundamental right of voting and the lack of information was claimed 
to be injurious to that right." I 18 On the other end of the spectrum, a court 
ventured to state that a "necessary injury in fact might ... be premised 
upon the ... violation of the Act itself.,,119 It expansively read Akins as 
recognizing "injury sufficient to confer standing resulting from violation 
of 'statute which ... does seek to protect individuals such as respondents 
from the kind of harm they say they have suffered.",120 
A majority of cases applying Akins appears to fall between these 
poles by requiring what Akins did not-some showing of injury in 
addition to a deprivation of information. 121 Even in the case of the voter-
117. Jd. (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975)). 
118. Heartwood, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv., No. 1:00-CV-683, 2001 WL 1699203, at *\0 (W.O. 
Mich. Dec. 3, 2001). In Atlantic States Legal Foundation v. Babbitt, a district court rejected a 
nonprofit environmental organization's standing to challenge the EPA's failure to produce an 
environmental impact statement (EIS) before issuing a permit allowing destruction of cormorant 
birds. 140 F. Supp. 2d 185, 194 (N.D.N.Y. 2001). The court distinguished Akins as having arisen in 
the "special context of voters' rights" and as uniquely "affected by the fact that the alleged 
informational injury was directly related to the core constitutional right to vote." Jd. at 193 n.8. It 
concluded that "the notion of informational harm, without more, does not confer standing in a NEPA 
case as it is inconsistent with the requirement of establishing concrete and particularized harm" 
under Lujan. Jd. at 194. However, the plaintiff did not rely upon the sheer absence of information to 
justify its standing. It articulated numerous theories of injury to aesthetic enjoyment and alleged that 
the lack of an EIS prevented it from distributing information about cormorant management, 
assessing the impact of the defendants' activities, publishing information to its members, and 
participating in the public commentary process guaranteed by the NEPA. Jd. at 192-94. None were 
considered sufficient to establish a justiciable case under Lujan. 
119. See Bloom v. NLRB, 153 F.3d 844, 849 n.2 (8th Cir. 1998) (noting that plaintiff's injury 
was premised on an employee petition for review of an order of the National Labor Relations Board 
approving settlement agreements between the employer and the union and dismissing his unfair 
labor practice charges), vacated, 525 U.S. 1133 (1999). 
120. Jd. (quoting FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11,22 (1998)). 
121. See. e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 306 F.3d 1144, 1147-48 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (finding that 
automobile manufacturer had standing to sue for judicial review of the EPA's framework of closed 
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plaintiff seeking FECA information, where the Supreme Court has itself 
acknowledged that the potential use for election-related information is 
self-evident,122 courts have required that plaintiffs separately demonstrate 
how they would use the information in voting. 123 
Only months ago, the D.C. Circuit in Citizens for Responsibility and 
Ethics in Washington [CREW} v. FEC124 relied upon a pre-Akins 
decision called Common Cause v. FEC125 to deny standing in a case 
challenging the FEC's dismissal of an administrative complaint under the 
FECA's citizen-suit provision and, in doing so, markedly marginalized 
Akins. Plaintiff CREW, a public interest group, challenged the receipt by 
President Bush's 2004 presidential campaign of a contact list containing 
information regarding conservative activists. 126 The FEC conducted an 
investigation and agreed that the list constituted an in-kind contribution 
under the FECA, and that the campaign violated the law, but declined to 
take further action. 127 CREW sued on an informational standing theory, 
claiming that an order requiring the FEC to assign a dollar value to the 
proceedings for new motor vehicle testing based on the "[plaintiffs] fairly detailed description of 
how the information that open rulemaking proceedings provide would prove useful to it"); Hodges v. 
Abraham, 300 F.3d 432, 444 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that NEPA plaintiffs possess a procedural right 
to have the Executive observe procedures mandated by law "'without meeting all the normal 
standards for redressability and immediacy'" but only if "'the procedures in question are designed to 
protect some threatened concrete interest of his that is the ultimate basis of his standing'" (quoting 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7, 573 n.8 (1992»); Kean for Congo Comm. v. 
FEC, 398 F. Supp. 2d 26, 34-35 (D.D.C. 2005) (considering both the statutory grant of right to 
requested information and whether "'there is no reason to doubt'" the usefulness of the information 
to plaintiff (quoting Akins, 524 U.S. at 21 »; Alliance for Democracy V. FEC, 335 F. Supp. 2d 39, 48 
(D.D.C. 2004) (construing Akins in FECA case as requiring that "plaintiffs ... show how [the 
information they seek] could have a concrete effect on plaintiffs' voting in future elections involving 
different candidates"); Ga. River Network v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs, 334 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 
1346 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (finding no standing under Akins where plaintiff suffered no injury as a result 
of delay in receiving notice of a permit). 
122. See Akins, 524 U.S. at 20, 24-26 (observing that information sought would "help voters 
understand who provides which candidates financial support" and that voting is a core constitutional 
right). 
123. In one FECA case, the court construed Akins as requiring that "plaintiffs ... show how [the 
information they seek] could have a concrete effect on plaintiffs' voting in future elections involving 
different candidates." Alliance/or Democracy, 335 F. Supp. 2d at 48. 
124. 475 F.3d 337 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
125. Although Common Cause V. FEC, 108 F.3d 413 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per curiam), predated the 
Supreme Court's decision in Akins, the D.C. Circuit itself had already decided Akins V. FEC, 101 
F.3d 731 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (en bane), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 524 U.S. II. In its 
Akins decision, the D.C. Circuit held that "'[a] voter deprived of useful information at the time he or 
she votes suffers a particularized injury' sufficient to create standing," but unlike the Supreme Court, 
the D.C. Circuit "expressly limited [its] recognition of this injury to those cases where the 
information denied is ... useful in voting." Common Cause, J08 F.3d at 418 (quoting Akins, JOI 
F.3d at 737). 
126. CREW, at 337-38. 
127. Id. at 338. 
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list would inure to the educational benefit of the voting public. 128 The 
district court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, finding under 
Akins that there was '''reason[] to doubt''' that the list's value constituted 
information that would be useful to CREW in voting, because it had no 
members and-unlike the Akins and Kean plaintiffs-was not a 
"participant[] in the political election and campaign process.,,129 The 
D.C. Circuit affirmed, distinguishing the Akins plaintiffs on the grounds 
that they had "wanted certain information so that they could make an 
informed choice among candidates in future elections," whereas "CREW 
cannot vote.,,130 
Unnecessarily, the D.C. Circuit's narrow treatment of Akins's reach 
did not stop with singling out voter-plaintiffs. First, the court went out of 
its way to express its "wonder why the case is not moot," as "[t]he 
election is over; President Bush is constitutionally barred from running 
again; and Vice President Cheney has announced that he will not run.,,131 
This language falls short of an outright suggestion that the only voter-
plaintiffs who could conceivably have standing to sue under the FECA's 
citizen-suit provision are those able to show injury to their ability to cast 
an informed vote in an imminent election, which would significantly 
limit the already circumscribed scope of § 437g(a)(8). 
Second, the D.C. Circuit's causation and redressability analysis 
challenged that of the Akins majority. Not unlike Justice Scalia in his 
Akins dissent, the D.C. Circuit indicated that the fact that "the 
Commission has no authority to order anyone to report anything" is 
preclusive of standing. 132 Even if the FEC brought an enforcement 
action, the court observed further, there is no required redress. 133 In 
other words, because CREW-like any FECA citizen plaintiff-was 
essentially attempting to prompt government regulation of someone else, 
causation and redressability were dispositive "problems.,,134 
To be sure, the D.C. Circuit's overriding policy concern was that 
CREW's complaint seemingly amounted to a disagreement "with the 
Commission's judgment that its resources were better employed on 
128. Id. at 339. 
129. Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. [CREW] v. FEC, 401 F. Supp. 2d lIS, 120-
21 (D.D.C. 2005) (quoting Kean for Congo Comm. V. FEC, 398 F. Supp. 2d 26, 35 (D.D.C. 2005)), 
aff'd, 475 F.3d 337 (D.C. CiT. 2007). 
130. CREW, 475 F.3d at 339. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. at 340. 
133. Id. 
134. Id. 
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h · ,,135 Th' . h bl' ot er, more Important matters. at court s concern WIt ena mg 
the judiciary to second-guess quintessentially Article II prerogatives was 
not new to its particular jurisprudence. 136 And, of course, it is 
unquestionably a critical component of the separation of powers. But as 
the CREW court acknowledged,137 Akins did not undermine this most 
basic of Article III standing's gate-keeping functions. So the CREW 
court did not need to confront the Akins analysis so heavy-handedly in 
order to justify its dismissal of the complaint on standing grounds. 
As discussed below,138 the CREW decision may in part reflect the 
judges' pragmatic views on the merits of the case; there appeared to be 
no meaningful campaign or election-related information still to be gained 
by the lawsuit. To support this aspect of its holding, the D.C. Circuit 
relied partially on its own dated jurisprudence, dismissing the argument 
that its 1997 decision in Common Cause '''must yield' to the Supreme 
Court's later decision in Akins.,,139 Indeed, the court flatly retorted that 
"[t]he short answer is that we have never overruled Common Cause and 
we have applied its holding and rationale after Akins.,,14o 
Although the D.C. Circuit's failure to marry its prior decision with 
Akins-instead merely noting that Common Cause is still standing in 
spite of it-is rather remarkable, the Supreme Court could have avoided 
the doctrinal problem by, first, making clear in Akins that it was 
reconfiguring (if not partially overruling) Lujan's strict causation and 
redressability requirements and, second, defining the ambit of the Akins 
standard. Because it cannot be fully reconciled with the leading public 
law case on constitutional standing, Akins is at risk of becoming a dead 
letter, as are the gains to standing law that its groundbreaking analysis 
135. [d. 
136. See id. at 341 n.2 (citing Am. Soc'y for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v. Ringling 
Bros. & Barnum & Bailey Circus, 317 F.3d 334, 337 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (finding standing to sue circus 
owner under the citizen-suit provision of the ESA because observation of physical manifestations of 
the alleged mistreatment of elephants "takes [plaintiffs] claim out of the category of a generalized 
interest in ensuring the enforcement of the law"); Wertheimer v. FEC, 268 F.3d 1070, 1074 (D.C. 
Cir. 2001) (finding no standing "under the Akins test" because appellants failed to show either that 
they were being deprived of information or that a favorable ruling would lead to disclosure of 
information); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FEC, 180 F.3d 277, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (dismissing FECA 
complaint for lack of standing because it did not even nominally allege reporting violations)). 
137. [d. at 340 ("The Supreme Court in Akins recognized that the Commission, like other 
Executive agencies, retains prosecutorial discretion." (citing FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11,25 (1998))). 
138. See infra Part IV.B. 
139. CREW, 475 F.3d at 341 n.2. 
140. [d. at 341 & n.2 (citing Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413, 418 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (per 
curiam) (finding no FECA standing to sue for "information concerning a violation of the Act as 
such")). 
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appeared to foreshadow. 141 There is simply no safe harbor in which to 
apply Akins as the law of the case. 
III. ARTICLE II AND THE CONGRESSIONAL GRANT OF FECA STANDING 
It is important to underscore that the D.C. Circuit could have 
comfortably pointed to the one piece of information that everyone agreed 
had not been disclosed in CREW-the value of the list of conservative 
activists at issue-and declared that standing exists to obtain such 
information under Akins if the FECA requires its disclosure. The court's 
quiet defiance of Akins's straightforward holding in this regard signals 
the CREW majority'sl42 discomfort with a justiciability jurisprudence 
that would enable review of Executive decision making on such trivial 
grounds, without any particularized Lujan-type injury. It reflects a 
fundamental and polarized policy debate about the proper role of the 
judiciary in the American tripartite system of government that is 
epitomized in the doctrinal clash between Lujan and Akins. 
This Part explains the competing justiciability theories underlying 
the two cases and concludes that, its significant merit notwithstanding, 
the private law model of adjudication upon which Lujan is based is not 
uniformly tenable; in the FECA context, at least, the public law model 
has warranted real consideration without meaningful encroachment on 
Executive prerogatives. Although the FECA's citizen-suit provision 
enables the judiciary to weigh in on Executive enforcement decisions, 
that influence is minimal and does not in-and-of-itself justify Lujan's 
expansive ban on generalized grievances. 
A. Executive Accountability and Generalized Grievances 
The injury-in-fact test as epitomized in Lujan is a judicial 
manifestation of the belief that the case-or-controversy requirement 143 is 
"founded in concern about the proper-and properly limited-role of the 
courts in a democratic society.,,144 Federal courts may exercise power 
"only 'in the last resort, and as a necessity, '" and only when use of the 
141. See Sunstein, supra note 10, at 616 (deeming Akins "by far the most important 
pronouncement on the general issue of standing to obtain information" and discussing its 
implications). 
142. Judge Garland concurred in the judgment on the grounds that "there is no meaningful 
distinction between this case and Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413 (D.C. Cir. 1997)." CREW, 
475 F.3d at 341 (Garland, J., concurring). 
143. See U.S. CONST. art.lIl, § 2 (outlining jurisdiction of courts). 
144. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
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judicial powers is "'consistent with a system of separated powers. ",145 
Viewed in the light of the respective spheres of influence that define the 
three branches of government, the standing doctrine assumes that judicial 
restraint enhances the ability of the executive and legislative branches to 
function effectively.146 In Allen v. Wright, the Court found that minority 
parents lacked standing to challenge tax deductions to segregated private 
schools, on the theory that judges would otherwise become "'virtually 
continuing monitors of the wisdom and soundness of Executive 
action",147 and impinge upon the President's prerogative to "'take Care 
that the Laws be faithfully executed. ",148 By this logic, a lawsuit aimed 
at "restructuring ... the apparatus established by the Executive Branch to 
fulfill its legal duties" fails to satisfy Article III on Article II separation 
of powers grounds. 149 
While the Framers' wisdom in precluding citizens from invoking the 
judiciary to force an agency to reorder its regulatory objectives is 
transparent, whether Congress can endow that power is trickier. The 
Supreme Court has wrestled with the question whether Congress can 
enact a law with a self-contained justiciability grant for decades. 150 
Although accepted in principle, lSI statutes like the FECA's citizen-suit 
provision are constitutionally controversial. In keeping with a so-called 
purely private law model of adjudication, Justice Scalia readily accepts 
that certain acts of Congress face dormancy or death if the Executive 
Branch refuses or fails to enforce them, and his Supreme Court opinions 
reflect this belief. 152 Adherents to this model eschew legislation that 
empowers private litigants to engage in enforcement activity, paired with 
a provision for judicial review, as "end runs" around the Executive. 
Standing exists under this theory to resolve primarily common-law-like 
145. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (internal citations omitted). 
146. See John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.1. 1219,1229 
(1993) (advocating strict adherence to the injury-in-fact test). 
147. 468 U.S. at 760 (quoting Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1,15 (1972». 
148. Id. at 761 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). 
149. Id.; see also Sunstein, supra note 5, at 194-95 (discussing the Allen v. Wright opinion in 
which the Court referred to Article II and separation of powers). 
150. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 193 (discussing the evolution of the congressionally created 
citizen suit). 
151. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (stating that the Supreme Court has recognized 
congressional power to create justiciable statutory rights). 
152. See Hudson P. Henry, A Shift in Citizen Suit Standing Doctrine: Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. 
Laidlaw Environmental Services, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 233, 240-41 (2001) (discussing Justice Scalia's 
1983 article, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 881 (1983». 
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interests, not those of beneficiaries of government regulation. 153 Justice 
Scalia makes this argument in his Akins dissent. 154 
Accordingly, in Lujan Justice Scalia described legislation granting 
and circumscribing agency authority to carry on governmental activities 
as '''permit[ting] the courts to participate in law enforcement ... only to 
the extent necessary to protect justiciable individual rights against 
administrative action fairly beyond the granted powers. ",155 By 
"[i]ndividual rights," Justice Scalia did "not mean public rights that have 
been legislatively pronounced to belong to each individual who forms 
part of the public.,,156 Chief Justice Roberts has similarly explained: 
[If] Congress . . . could specify that any person who wants to sue the 
agency in federal court may do so if he believes the agency is not living 
up to its mandate[, s]uch a state of affairs would transform the courts 
into ombudsmen of the administrative bureaucracy, a role for which 
they are ill-suited both institutionally and as a matter of democratic 157 theory. 
Although Justice Scalia's OplnIOn in Lujan accepted the principle that 
'''[t]he ... injury required by Art. III may exist solely by virtue of 
statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates standing, ",158 
it did so only with the caveat that "in suits against the Government, at 
least, the concrete injury requirement must remain.,,159 It is therefore 
unsurprising that in his Akins dissent, Justice Scalia focused on the nature 
of the requisite injury: "'Particularized' means that 'the injury must 
affect the plaintiff in a personal and individual way.' If the effect is 
'undifferentiated and common to all members of the public,' the plaintiff 
153. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 187-88 (discussing standing in the context of common law). 
154. See FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11,31 (1998) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that if such 
provisions "were commonplace, the role of the Executive ... would be greatly reduced"). See also 
Justice Scalia's dissenting opinion in Friends a/the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services 
(TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 198 (2000) (Scalia, J., dissenting), concluding that the majority turned the 
injury-in-fact requirement into a "sham" by finding that an environmental group had standing to 
bring a citizen action against a wastewater treatment facility for noncompliance with the limits set by 
the facility's National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit, and his majority opinion in 
Steel Co. v. Citizens/or a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83,109-10 (1998), denying standing for a 
citizen-suit claim under the Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act. 
155. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (quoting Stark v. Wickard, 321 
U.S. 288,309-10 (1944)) (emphasis added). 
156. Id. at 578. 
157. Roberts, supra note 146, at 1232. 
158. 504 U.S. at 578 (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975)) (alteration in original) 
(internal quotation marks omitted). 
159. Id. 
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has a 'generalized grievance' that must be pursued by political, rather 
h . d' . I ,,160 t an JU ICla, means. 
This one-size-fits-all understanding of the relationships between the 
judicial branch and the elected branches of functioning democracy 
assumes that accountability for agencies "not living up to [their] 
mandate[s]" 1 61 lies elsewhere. In particular, it assumes that Congress or 
the President, properly influenced by voters, will wield political pressure 
on an ineffective agency to get it to do its job, or change the law so as to 
ensure that endemic problems are remedied. 
For his part, Justice Scalia's answer to the problem of agency failure 
to enforce an Act of Congress is decidedly not to expand private access 
to the courts, which he views as "restrict[ ed] ... to their assigned role of 
protecting minority rather than majority interests.,,'62 He has both asked 
the rhetorical question: "Does what I have said mean that, so long as no 
minority interests are affected, 'important legislative purposes, heralded 
in the halls of Congress, [can be] lost or misdirected in the vast hallways 
of the federal bureaucracy?'" and answered it: "Of course it does-and a 
good thing, too," because "[t]he ability to lose or misdirect laws can be 
said to be one of the prime engines of social change.,,'63 The Supreme 
Court elsewhere explained it this way: "The assumption that if 
respondents have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, is not 
a reason to find standing.,,'64 
Because separation-of-powers concerns implicate not only the proper 
allocation and preservation of Presidential power-but also that of the 
legislature and the judiciary-Justice Scalia's response does not 
adequately address the question raised by the Akins/Lujan dilemma: Can 
Congress endow citizens with standing to challenge in federal court 
agency nonenforcement of legislation? The Constitution provides no 
guidance for determining which laws are enforceable only through the 
political process. If Congress determines that agency enforcement of its 
legislative initiatives is inadequate, and that citizens should have access 
to the courts to prompt enforcement of the law, does the Constitution 
forbid Congress from legislating standing for that purpose? Under such 
circumstances, the political solution to underenforcement that the private 
160. FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. II, 35 (1998) (Scalia, 1., dissenting) (quoting United States v. 
Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 177 (1974) and Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 & n.I). 
161. Roberts, supra note 146, at 1232. 
162. Scalia, supra note 152, at 895. 
163. Id at 897 (quoting Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. U.S. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 
449 F.2d 1109, IIII (D.C. Cir. 1971)) (alteration in original). 
164. Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227 (1974). 
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law model relies upon-Executive oversight or more and better 
legislation-is presumably insufficient, at least in the eyes of Congress. 
Lujan would not nullify citizen-suit legislation under such circumstances, 
but would stave off litigation absent identification of a plaintiff who can 
show the requisite individualized harm. 
The public law model, by contrast, would unambiguously empower 
Congress to create causes of action that confer standing on particular 
plaintiffs without requiring a differentiated showing of injury,165 and 
conceives of the judiciary's role in the separation of powers as integral to 
ensuring Executive compliance with the law. Accordingly, Justice 
Blackmun dissented in Lujan because he was "unable to agree with the 
plurality's analysis of redressability, based as it is on its invitation of 
executive lawlessness.,,166 On this theory, the FECA's citizen-suit 
provision represents an attempt to ensure, through the courts, "the 
integrity of our electoral process, and, not less, the responsibility of the 
individual citizen for the successful functioning of that process.,,167 
Both Lujan and Akins involved challenges to agencies' procedural 
failures-nonadherence to interagency consultation requirements and the 
refusal to investigate an alleged campaign finance violation, 
respectively-pursuant to statutes that authorized citizen suits as means 
of enforcement. Akins clearly held that Congress has the power to create 
standing by delineating procedural rights that are enforceable by an 
undifferentiated citizenry. Although Lujan suggests that self-executing 
citizen-suit statutes are unconstitutional absent a plaintiff with 
particularized injury,168 Justice Blackmun's dissent expressed a contrary 
hope that "over time the Court will acknowledge that some classes of 
procedural duties are so enmeshed with the prevention of a substantive, 
concrete harm that an individual plaintiff may be able to demonstrate a 
sufficient likelihood of injury just through the breach of that procedural 
dUty.,,169 
The conflation of the public and the private that Justice Blackmun 
foresaw has already emerged in some cases, and undermines the practical 
viability of the private law model. Several examples of procedural harms 
deemed justiciable by the courts exist. The Freedom of Information Act 
165. See generally Henry, supra note 152, at 241 (discussing the public and private law models). 
166. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 601 (1992) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
167. United States v. UAW, 352 U.S. 567, 570 (1957); see also Becker v. FEC, 230 FJd 381, 
389 (1st Cir. 2000) (finding that Ralph Nader had standing to sue the FEC "[i]n light of the FECA's 
concern with ensuring that corporate funds do not undermine the fairness of federal elections"). 
168. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 95. 
169. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 605 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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(FOIA),170 the most obvious of these, endows an undifferentiated public 
right to information. Its uncontroversial enforcement by the courts 
manifests the view that, "as a general matter, the courts owe substantial 
deference to Congress' substantive purpose in imposing a procedural 
requirement.,,171 The existence of early qui tam suits authorizing private 
citizens to litigate on behalf of the public, moreover, provides historical 
evidence that the Supreme Court's individualized injury requirement is 
out-of-sync with the Constitution.172 In an opinion authored by Justice 
Scalia, the modem Court upheld the federal False Claims Act's qui tam 
provisions under Article III without a showing that the relator was 
injured by the alleged fraud. 173 
To be sure, Akins's recognition of the judiciary's statutory 
prerogative to force the other branches of government to "do their jobs" 
is circumscribed. A district court prominently refused to read Akins as 
requiring disclosure of information by Vice President Dick Cheney to the 
Comptroller General, for example, regarding meetings of his national 
energy task force in Walker v. Cheney.174 The pertinent statute allows 
the Comptroller General to enforce statutory investigatory powers by 
bringing a civil action to require agency heads to produce records. 175 
The court declined to construe the legislative grant of enforcement power 
as authorizing suit by the Comptroller General because to do so would 
"affect[] the balance of power between the Article I and Article II 
Branches.,,176 Although nominally a standing decision, the court was 
170. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000). 
171. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 606 (Blackmun, 1., dissenting). Professor Cass Sunstein maintains, 
accordingly, that "[a)n injury in fact ... is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for 
standing" because "[w)hether a plaintiff has standing depends on what the relevant statute says." 
Sunstein, supra note 10, at 639, 637-38; see also Fletcher, supra note 62, at 253-54 (arguing that the 
Court acts improperly in denying standing where Congress explicitly conferred it). 
172. See Morrison, supra note 68, at 626 & n.168 (collecting articles). 
173. See Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rei. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774 (2000) 
(finding that the "United States' injury in fact suffices to confer standing" on the relator). In 
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources, Justice Scalia rejected the argument that the statutory 
monetary rewards provided to the private-party relator if the complaint results in money damages to 
the government are sufficient to confer standing, since that interest does not "consist of obtaining 
compensation for, or preventing, the violation of a legally protected right." Id. at 772-73. Instead, 
he grounded standing for qui tam relators on the "doctrine that the assignee of a claim has standing 
to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor." Id. at 773. Professor Sunstein has also 
advocated legislation that includes bounties to prevailing plaintiffs for purposes of satisfying the 
injury-in-fact standard as it exists. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 168. 
174. See 230 F. Supp. 2d 51, 66 n.IO (D.D.C. 2002) (distinguishing Akins by noting that the 
lawsuit was brought "by private parties, not government officials, and thus involved injuries in 
which the plaintiffs ... had only a personal stake"). 
175. 31 U.S.C. § 716(b)(2) (2000). 
176. Walker, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 69-70. 
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fundamentally troubled by the separation of powers implications of the 
statute itself. I77 The Vice President argued that "Congress cannot, 
consistent with separation of powers principles, endow the Comptroller 
General with the authority to bring this judicial action.,,178 Although the 
dispute involved Congress's attempt to enforce its own rights to 
Executive Branch information,179 the court's view rested on the same 
theory underlying Justice Scalia's dissent in Akins-that the role of the 
courts is to protect "the constitutional rights and liberties of individual 
citizens and minority groups against oppressive or discriminatory 
. ,,180 government actIon. 
The Cheney decision is consistent with the thrust of Lujan standing 
jurisprudence that virtually forecloses the generic citizen from seeking to 
remedy general complaints about how the Executive Branch is operating. 
In this respect, "informational standing"-or standing to obtain 
information a statute makes public-is a rarity. 181 Although Akins 
represents a shift in the majority of the then-current Justices' thinking 
toward allowing Congress to authorize citizens to bring lawsuits 
enforcing government regulations, the Court is by no means ready to 
dispense with the injury-in-fact requirement. 182 The Lujan Court's 
separation-of-powers stance that "[v ]indicating the public interest 
(including the public interest in Government observance of the 
Constitution and laws) is the function of Congress and the Chief 
177. See id. at 59 (discussing merits). 
178. Id. at 60. 
179. See id. at 71 (discussing the Comptroller General's arguments as to why Congress has the 
right to the Executive Branch information). 
180. Id. at 72 (citing United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 192 (1974) (Powell, J., 
concurring)). Implicit in another case, United States House of Representatives v. United States 
Department of Commerce, II F. Supp. 2d 76 (D.D.C. 1998), is the opposing viewpoint. The court 
found that the House of Representatives had Article III standing to sue the Commerce Department 
and the Census Bureau challenging their plan to use statistical sampling in the upcoming census 
because the alleged failure to use the statutorily required methodology was an "informational and 
compositional injur[y]." Id. at 91. 
181. See Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. FEC, 69 F.3d 600, 603 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("This 
statute is unusual in that it permits a private party to challenge the FEC's decision not to enforce."). 
But cf Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 198-215 (2000) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (addressing citizen-suit provision in Water Act); supra note 33 and 
accompanying text (listing a handful of federal statutes expressly conferring standing on "any 
person," "citizen," or "party" to challenge agency actions). 
182. Henry, supra note 152, at 249; see also Lance v. Coffman, 127 S. Ct. 1194, 1198 (per 
curiam) (finding that Colorado citizens lacked standing to bring a challenge under the Elections 
Clause of the U.S. Constitution because "[t]he only injury plaintiffs allege is that the law ... has not 
been followed [which] is precisely the kind of undifferentiated, generalized grievance about the 
conduct of government that we have refused to countenance in the past"). But cf Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 127 S. Ct. 1438, 1453-56 (2007) (adopting Akins analysis to find that State has standing to sue 
the EPA to force rulemaking concerning widely-shared global warming risks). 
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Executive" is unassailable at the margins. 183 The barrier to adjudicating 
generalized grievances properly prevents the pure ideologue from suing 
over distaste with how the government is operating. 184 Given the myriad 
problems with the injury-in-fact test as we know it, what is less evident is 
whether the Court's endowment of the Lujan standard with "separation-
of-powers significance" properly keeps the judiciary out of the business 
of vindicating the public interest. 185 
B. The Case of the FEC: Circularity and Conundrum 
As Justice Stevens noted in his Lujan concurrence, "[ w]e must 
presume that if this Court holds that [the ESA] requires consultation, all 
affected agencies would abide by that interpretation," as "[c]ertainly the 
Executive Branch cannot be heard to argue that an authoritative 
construction of the governing statute by this Court may simply be 
ignored by an agency head.,,186 An adherent to the private law model 
might be comfortable resting on faith that the Executive will consistently 
choose to follow the law for fear of political reprisal. If Jane Doe's 
frustration with the federal government's budget failures is insufficiently 
concrete to trigger the jurisdiction of an Article III court, she need only 
cast her votes in protest or, failing that, lobby her congressional 
representatives for reform. The harshness that, on certain facts, Lujan's 
injury-in-fact standard produces is palatable to some only because the 
political branches are positioned to handle generalized grievances. 
A citizen-suit statute challenges this view of the separation of powers 
by enabling outsiders to invoke the judiciary to enhance traditional 
Executive enforcement mechanisms in a statutory arena of particular 
congressional concern. Although Congress sets the parameters for 
Executive enforcement action by passing the laws to be enforced, the 
Constitution does not expressly enable or preclude the legislation of 
private citizens' access to the courts to bring about enforcement 
activity. 187 Democratic theory aside, the separation of powers concerns 
183. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576 (1992). 
184. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 96. 
185. 504 U.S. at 577. 
186. Id. at 585 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
187. Congress has broad power under the Necessary and Proper Clause of the Constitution to 
pass legislation to redress social, economic, and other problems the legislature identifies as 
important. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18; see a/so M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 
323-26 (1819) (examining Congress's role in determining what is "necessary and proper"). The 
dimensions of that power under the text and history of the Constitution is an issue that is beyond the 
scope of this Article. 
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that underlie a pure private law model of adjudication are somewhat 
alleviated empirically by the fact that Congress's invocation of its 
perceived power to endow citizens with the right to sue to enforce 
legislation is hardly ubiquitous. 188 It is thus fair to assume that political 
accountability is sufficient for ensuring that the laws are properly 
enforced in most instances. 
If the private law model correctly assumes that politics suffice to 
ensure Executive accountability in all areas of congressional and public 
concern, the question arises as to whether the FECA's citizen suit (and 
Akins's substantiation of it) is justifiable at all. This subpart considers 
that question and concludes that, in light of the widespread but disparate 
criticism of the FEC's effectiveness, the FECA's circumscribed citizen-
suit provision is a reasonable exercise of Congress's power to "legislate" 
this type of standing. 
The FECA's citizen-suit provision was added as an amendment to 
the original bill and is described in the legislative history as "the one 
provision . . . that will enable the public to get a better look at the 
investigative process to be used against suspected violators of the 
law.,,189 The sparse legislative history suggests that the provision was at 
its inception and has since been uncontroversial in the Congress. The 
1976 amendments allowed "any person," including a member or 
employee of the FEC, to file a verified (versus anonymous) 
administrative complaint. 190 In the floor debate over the 1979 
amendments, one member explained: 
The Commission is entrusted with the responsibility of passing on 
complaints. [The citizen-suit provision] provides that an order 
dismissing a complaint is reviewable in court solely to assure that the 
Commission's action is not based on an error of law. And to assure 
that the Commission does not shirk its responsibility to decide that 
section also provides that a total failure to address a complaint within 
120 days is a basis for a court action. 191 
188. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
189. S. REP. No. 92-229, at 110 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1821, 1848. 
190. H.R. REP. NO. 94-1057, at 50 (1976) (Conf. Rep.). 
191. 125 CONGo REC. 36,744, 36,754 (1979) (statement of Sen. Pel\). Senator Pel\ goes on to 
state 
these two limited bases for judicial intervention are not intended to work a transfer of 
prosecutorial discretion from the Commission to the courts. Thus, for example, if the 
Commission considers a case and is evenly divided as to whether to proceed, that 
division which under the act precludes Commission action on the merits is not subject to 
review any more than a similar prosecutorial decision by a U.S. attorney. 
Id. The current statute does not include a carve-out to preclude review of a tie vote by the 
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Whether the speaker's concern with the Commission "shirk[ing] its 
responsibility" is valid remains a sharply debated question. Critics 
disagree over whether the FEC is too lax or too stringent in enforcing the 
law, both sides arguing that-for very opposite reasons-the current 
system is flawed in one way or another. 192 
The FEC was created in 1974 for purposes of administering and 
enforcing the federal campaign finance laws and is reputed to be a 
"toothless tiger" amongst some critics. 193 By virtue of its structure, 
critics contend, the Commission is inherently conflicted in terms of the 
vigor with which it can reasonably be expected to enforce the terms of 
the FECA against politicians, their parties, and their affiliates. 194 The 
FEC comprises six politicized members, three from each party, and a 
deadlocked vote kills an enforcement action. 195 The 1974 statute 
creating the agency empowered Congress to appoint four of the six 
commissioners with the President choosing the other two,196 but the 
Supreme Court struck down this system in Buckley v. Valeo on the 
grounds that it violated the President's appointment authority under 
Article II of the Constitution.197 Congress amended the FECA in 1976 to 
shift the appointment power entirely to the President on confirmation by 
the Senate,198 but it is said to be "common knowledge" that congressional 
party leaders have continued to exercise considerable power over the 
Commission, which would make little sense in any event. A 3-3 vote is effectively a decision not to 
take enforcement action, although a majority did not so find. A 4-3 vote not to take enforcement 
action, by contrast, implies that commissioners from both sides of the political aisle agree to stand 
down on a complaint. 
192. See generally Todd Lochner, Overdeterrence, Underdeterrence, and a (Half-Hearted) Call 
for a Scarlet Letter Approach to Deterring Campaign Finance Violations, 2 ELECTION L.J. 23 
(2003) (addressing both critiques and suggesting a public shaming approach to campaign finance 
violators). 
193. E.g., Amanda S. La Forge, Comment, The Toothless Tiger-Structural, Political and Legal 
Barriers to Effective FEC Enforcement: An Overview and Recommendations, 10 ADMIN. L.J. 351, 
358-73 (1996); Bill McAllister, FEC Admits Failures in Plea for Funding: Agency Outlines Wide 
Probe of '96 Campaign, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 1997, at A8. See generally PROJECT FEC, No BARK, 
NO BITE, No POINT: THE CASE FOR CLOSING THE FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION AND 
ESTABLISHING A NEW SYSTEM FOR ENFORCING THE NATION'S CAMPAIGN FINANCE LAWS 5 (2002) 
(arguing the Commission's structure prevents it from being effective). 
194. See, e.g., La Forge, supra note 193, at 365 ("[T]he FEC finds itself in the unique position of 
regulating the very people who control its annual budget."); McAllister, supra note 193 (reporting on 
the FEe's admission that it had "failed to move swiftly against politicians who violate campign 
finance laws"). See generally PROJECT FEC, supra note 193 (advocating dissolution of the FEC and 
the establishment ofa new means to enforce campaign finance laws). 
195. See 2 U.S.C. § 437c (2000) (describing structure of FE C). 
196. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 3 10(a) (I), 88 
Stat. 1263, 1280--81, declared unconstitutional by Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. I (1976). 
197. 424 U.S. at 132-36 (per curiam); PROJECT FEC, supra note 193, at 15. 
198. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 101(a)(l), 90 
Stat. 475, 475. 
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appointment process. 199 As a result, the choice of commissioners can 
rest on political affiliations rather than expertise.z°o In overseeing an 
agency whose mission is to oversee members of Congress, Congress has 
been accused of underfunding the FEC, launching intrusive audits, and 
otherwise hobbling its regulator. 20 I Numerous courts have derided the 
FEC as having historically taken "a permissive view" of the campaign 
laws.z°2 
This portrait of the "FEC-as-Iapdog" of the politicians is strongly 
disputed, with other scholars depicting a very different agency that is not 
only competent and adaptable, but guilty of overenforcement of the 
campaign finance and election laws in excess of the Commission's 
constitutional and statutory authority.203 There is purportedly 
"widespread belief' amongst the practicing bar that the FEC goes after 
minor players to affect legal behavior by intimidation,z°4 and courts have 
repeatedly struck down the FEC's construction of the FECA as vastly 
overreaching.z°5 Whether guilty of underenforcement or 
overenforcement, then, the FEC is a reasonably susceptible target for 
199. PROJECT FEC, supra note 193, at 16 (citing Jackie Koszczuk, Money Woes Leave FEC 
Watchdog with More Bark Than Bite, 56 CONGo Q. 469,469 (1998); Peter H. Stone, Teaching a 
Lapdog to Bite, 25 NAT'L J. 2914, 2914 (1993); Tim Curran, Secretary of Senate Gets Official Nod 
by the President to Become Member of the Federal Election Commission, ROLL CALL, Sept. 30, 
1996). 
200. Id. at 15-18,60--65. Former FEC Commissioner Frank Reiche has explained that members 
of Congress "view the members of the commission as representatives of their party-you can't have 
a successful campaign finance commission if that is the premise upon which appointments are 
made." Deirdre Davidson, Who's Afraid of the FEC?: Why the FEC Doesn't Have Any Weight to 
Throw Around, TOMPAINE.COM, Oct. 3, 2000, http://www.tompaine.com/Archive/scontenti 
3700.html. 
201. PROJECT FEC, supra note 193, at 19. 
202. Shays V. FEC, 414 F.3d 76, 81,106 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (stating also that FEC rules "fly in the 
face" of the enabling statute's purpose, and noting the "absurdity" of the FEC's position); see also, 
e.g., McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 142 (2003) (finding that FEC had "subverted" federal election 
campaign laws); Shays v. FEC, 337 F. Supp. 2d 28, 63, 70, 79 (D.D.C. 2004) (finding that 
challenged FEC regulation would "undercut[] FECA's statutory purpose" and "foster corruption," 
and observing that the challenged FEC regulation would "render the statute largely meaningless"), 
aff'd, 414 F.3d 76. 
203. Bradley A. Smith & Stephen M. Hoersting, A Toothless Anaconda: Innovation, Impotence 
and Overenforcement at the Federal Election CommiSSion, I ELECTION LJ. 145, 162--63 (2002). 
For a point-by-point response to the arguments underlying the view that the FEC is a meek 
enforcement agency, see Bradley A. Smith, Campaign Finance Reform: What Congress and the 
FEC Should Do Next, 1881 P.L.1. CORP. 347, 350-55 (2002). 
204. Smith & Hoersting, supra note 203, at 156. 
205. Id. at 162--69 (discussing cases); see also, e.g., FEC v. Christian Action Network, Inc., 110 
F.3d 1049, 1050 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding that FEC's position that advocacy organization's 
expenditures for television commercial violated federal election laws governing disclosure of 
campaign funds lacked substantial justification under the Equal Access to Justice Act). 
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third party enforcement mechanisms such as the FECA's citizen-suit 
provision. 
Additionally, it is important to keep in mind that the scope of the 
FECA's citizen-suit provision is relatively narrow. On balance, 
Congress was not overreaching in allowing judicial review of certain 
nonenforcement decisions. The FEC does rely on outside complaints in 
some measure to carry out its statutory mandate. Although FECA 
enforcement proceedings germinate either internally from FEC 
investigators or externally from third-party complaints,206 a 1999 study of 
approximately eighty FEC matters under review (also known as 
"MURs") revealed that a heavy proportion-sixty-three percent-were 
initiated by outside parties,207 who were more likely to target campaigns 
and candidates208 and to allege disclosure violations-as in Akins-than 
so-called "substantive" FECA violations, such as excessive contributions 
or the use of prohibited funds. 209 The universe of claims that potentially 
trigger the FECA's citizen-suit provision is comprised exclusively of 
those that are dismissed prior to investigation and those for which the 
Commission failed to timely take any action whatsoever.2lO About 
thirty-two percent of the sample claims were dismissed preinvestigation, 
and eighty-eight percent of those were brought by third parties. 211 
Given that a majority of the dismissed sample complaints were 
brought by outside parties, scholars have posited that a large portion of 
third-party complaints may amount to frivolous gamesmanship aimed at 
206. The FEC is an independent agency with exclusive jurisdiction over enforcement of the 
FECA. 2 U.S.c. §§ 437c(b)(l), 437d(a)(3), 437g (2000). The Commission is authorized to institute 
investigations of possible FECA violations and "any person" may file a sworn administrative 
complaint alleging a violation of the Act. Id. § 437g(a)(l)-(2). Upon receipt ofa complaint and any 
response, the FEC's General Counsel usually forwards a recommendation to the Commission as to 
whether there is "reason to believe" or "RTB" that a violation of the Act has occurred, and the 
Commission votes. Id. If four or more members find RTB, the FEC commences an investigation. 
Id. After the investigation, the full Commission votes again, this time to determine if there is 
"probable cause" to believe the FECA has been violated. Jd. § 437g(a)(4)(A)(i). If a majority finds 
probable cause, the FEC will attempt to reach a conciliation agreement. Id. In the absence of such 
an agreement, the Commission can vote to institute a de novo civil enforcement action. Id. § 
437g(a)(6)(A). At any point in the process, a tie vote will lead to dismissal of the complaint. See 
Common Cause v. FEC, 108 F.3d 413,415 (D.C. CiT. 1997) (per curiam) (discussing facts where a 
deadlocked Commission led to dismissal of a complaint). 
207. Todd Lochner & Bruce E. Cain, Equity and Efficacy in the Enforcement of Campaign 
Finance Laws, 77 TEX. L. REv. 1891, 1910, 1927 (1999). 
208. Id. at 1912. 
209. Id. at 1913. 
210. See 2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8)(A) (providing that "[a]ny party aggrieved by an order of the 
Commission dismissing a complaint filed by such party [with the FEC], or by a failure of the 
Commission to act on such complaint during the 120-day period beginning on the date the complaint 
is filed, may file a petition with the United States District Court for the District of Columbia"). 
211. Lochner & Cain, supra note 207, at 1916, 1920. 
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Irntating political opponents.212 Facilitating judicial review for this 
group of claimants might exacerbate any wasted resources problem that 
already exists. But the protracted administrative process for disposing of 
these claims-with most taking a minimum of eleven months to 
conclude-undermines the deterrent value of enforcement within any 
particular campaign cycle.213 To the extent third parties do file 
administrative complaints simply to anger an opponent, their incentive to 
expend the resources to challenge a dismissal in court one or two years 
later-postelection-seems diminutive, as evidenced by the mere 
handful of cases involving citizen-suit complaints,z14 The goal of 
winning an election may justify law-breaking and the attendant penalties, 
which are internalized as a cost of doing business. 215 As the adverse 
publicity caused by the filing of an administrative complaint is not 
considered a formidable deterrent for election law violators,216 the 
purportedly large percentage of third-party complaints that end in 
dismissal has not translated into a flood of FECA citizen-suit litigation. 
If the dismissed claims that wind up in court do predominantly 
involve the FECA's disclosure provisions, they may constitute an 
appropriate subgroup of claims for which the extraordinary third-party 
enforcement measure should apply. Public opinion favors election and 
campaign finance laws.217 The Supreme Court has noted "a profound 
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues should 
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,,,218 and, applying this principle to 
disclosure provisions, has stated that "disclosure requirements deter 
212. ld. at 1904, 1920. 
213. ld. at 1929, 1932. 
214. A review of the FEC's website identifies fifty-seven FECA cases filed in federal court 
between 2001 and 2006. Alphabetical Index of FEC Court Cases, http://www.fec.gov/law/ 
litigationalpha.shtml (last visited Mar. 9, 2007). Ten of these were citizen suits brought pursuant to 
2 U.S.C. § 437g(a)(8). Hagelin v. FEC, 411 F.3d 237 (D.C. Cir. 2005); Citizens for Responsibility 
& Ethics in Wash. v. FEC, 401 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D.D.C. 2005), aff'd, 475 F.3d 337; Alliance for 
Democracy v. FEC, 362 F. Supp. 2d 138 (D. D.C. 2005); ludicial Watch v. FEC, No. Civ.A. 01-
1747,2005 WL 433344 (D.D.C. Feb. 17,2005); Kean for Congo Comm. V. FEC, 398 F. Supp. 2d 26 
(D. D.C. 2005); Alliance for Democracy V. FEC, 335 F. Supp. 2d 39 (D.D.C. 2004); Bush-Cheney 
'04, Inc. V. FEC, No. 04CVOl501 (D.D.C. filed Sept. I, 2004); Akins V. FEC, No. 03CV02431 
(D.D.C. filed Nov. 25, 2003); ludicial Watch V. FEC, 293 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 2003); Common 
Cause V. FEC, No. 0lCV02423 (D.D.C. filed Nov. 21, 2001). A Westlaw search revealed an 
additional citizen-suit case, Tierney V. FEC, No. I :06CV00663, 2006 WL 1344027 (D.D.C. Apr. II, 
2006). Together, these eleven cases comprise roughly nineteen percent of all FECA cases filed from 
2001 to 2006. 
215. Lochner & Cain, supra note 207, at 1930. 
216. ld. at 1919. 
217. Lauren Eber, Waiting for Watergate: The Long Road to FEe Reform, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 
1155, 1158 (2006). 
218. N.Y. Times CO. V. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964). 
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actual corruption and avoid the appearance of corruption by exposing 
large ... expenditures to the light of publicity.,,219 Disclosure educates 
voters220 and prevents circumvention of other aspects of the federal 
election laws.221 The Court has gone so far as to characterize the 
disclosure provisions as constitutionally moored-"a reasonable and 
minimally restrictive method of furthering First Amendment values.,,222 
Moreover, disclosure may occupy a uniquely useful role in election 
and campaign finance regulation and in deterring would-be violators. 
Although the FEC's critics disagree over the nature and source of the 
enforcement problem, two points seem uncontroversial. First, the current 
regulatory enforcement scheme-which relies upon relatively trivial and 
untimely administrative or civil fines-is ineffective and, second, the 
reasons for its ineffectiveness include one that is intractable: First 
Amendment limitations on enjoining pre-election political speech.223 
Some have therefore suggested that "an emphasis on disclosure and 
enforcement by 'information'" is a uniquely viable solution to the 
problem.224 If third-party complaints do, in fact, disproportionately raise 
disclosure violations, third-party enforcement would enhance the 
agency's ability to effectively carry out a core aspect of its mission.225 
As for the overenforcement critique of the FEC, vigorous standing 
challenges by the Commission are an inapposite fix. The FEC is 
simultaneously assailed for weak enforcement and for "look[ing] 
219. Buckley v. Val eo, 424 U.S. 1,67 (1976). 
220. See Nichol, supra note 59, at 334 ("Other rulings" by the Supreme Court "have [also] ... 
been thought to bolster democratic participation rather than to thwart it," e.g., "it makes little sense 
to say that traditional victims of discrimination or those who have been effectively shut out of 
democratic processes ought to be relegated to asserting their most fundamental rights only through 
electoral politics. "). 
221. See FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 155 (2003) (discussing regulation of corporate 
electoral involvement and use of organizations as conduits for circumvention of contribution limits); 
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 67-68 (stating that disclosure requirements are an essential means of gathering 
data necessary to detect contribution limit violations and the evils of campaign corruption). 
222. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 82; see also, e.g., First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 
792 n.32 (1978) (discussing that identification of the source of advertising may be required). But 
here again, there is legitimate debate. Although disclosure informs voters, it comes at the cost of 
hindering anonymous political speech. Smith, supra note 203, at 361-62 (citing Mcintyre v. Ohio 
Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334 (1995)). 
223. See, e.g., Bradley A. Smith, McConnell v. Federal Election Commission: Ideology Trumps 
Reality, Pragmatism, 3 ELECTION L.J. 345, 350-51 (discussing the tension between the "appearance 
of corruption" rationale for legislation limiting political speech and the infringements on First 
Amendment rights). 
224. Lochner & Cain, supra note 207, at 1892, 1935-36. 
225. Citizen standing to obtain judicial review of the Commission's nonenforcement decisions 
also serves to counteract perceived political bias on the part of the FEC in its enforcement process. 
See id. at 1894 (explaining that many critics of the FEC suggest that the FEC fails in its enforcement 
because it is biased toward the party controlling Congress). 
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everywhere" to expand the scope of its investigations to capture bit 
players.226 Small grassroots organizations lack the expertise and capital 
to readily comply with the FECA's onerous disclosure provisions and 
may be disproportionately "chill[ed]" in their legal activities for fear of 
FEC scrutiny.227 But the limited research that exists does not suggest 
that the citizen-suit provision worsens the problems identified with 
FECA enforcement. Although the FECA's citizen-suit provision reflects 
an unambiguous legislative objective to shift some measure of power and 
control over its enforcement to private citizens via access to the 
judiciary, it impacts a narrow range of cases and is poised only to 
marginally disturb the agency's prerogative to enforce the law. As a test 
case for considering the relative merits of the private and public law 
models of adjudication, therefore, Congress's circumscribed mechanism 
for ensuring that the FEC does not shirk its enforcement responsibilities 
comfortably warrants the Court's constitutional approval in Akins. 
IV. TOWARD A NEW JUSTICIABILITY PARADIGM: FECA STANDING AND 
BEYOND 
With the specter of excessive judicial interference under § 437g(a)(8) 
dispelled, this Part attempts to reconcile Lujan and Akins and the 
polarized theories of adjudication at play. Courts should, as a matter of 
sound justiciability jurisprudence, honor congressional intent and Akins's 
clear holding by affording information-seeking plaintiffs standing per se 
under the FECA's citizen-suit provision. Although the broader 
implications of Akins have not been fully realized, this Part attempts to 
justify modest expansion of its premises. 
Despite the rigidity of Lujan's injury-in-fact test, the Supreme Court 
has already retracted from the causation and redressability requirements 
in cases implicating the enforcement of public rights. As this Part 
observes, this doctrinal development is sensible. Because the standards 
for substantive review of the Executive's nonenforcement decisions are 
deferential, the separation-of-powers concerns underlying the private law 
model of adjudication are satisfied at the merits stage of the litigation in 
226. Smith, supra note 203, at 356-57. 
227. Jd. Although this Article proposes that courts adopt a FOIA-like perspective that would 
treat FECA citizen-suit standing as virtually automatic, whether citizen standing should be expanded 
to capture overenforcement practices or whether it exacerbates the perceived intimidation of small 
groups as it stands is another matter. Further research is necessary to determine empirically whether 
meritless complaints against tangential violators, dismissed by the FEC, end up in citizen-suit 
litigation to an unacceptable degree or, more importantly, whether the threat of litigation worsens the 
effects of enforcement on remote actors engaging in legitimate activities. 
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FECA cases. An Akins approach to standing that focuses on statutory 
injury without requiring strict causation and redressability would create 
incentives for agency compliance with the law by affording more merits 
scrutiny. 
A. Per Se FECA Standing and the Emerging Irrelevance of Causation 
and Redressability 
As described in Part II, Akins collides with Lujan on causation and 
redressability when the facts are such that it appears "entirely conjectural 
whether the nonagency activity that affects [plaintiffs] will be altered or 
affected by the agency activity they seek to achieve.,,228 These words, 
authored by Justice Scalia, articulate a standard that would render 
standing virtually impossible to satisfy in cases involving something 
other than direct regulation of the plaintiff, such as, for example, the 
denial of a pollution permit. In Akins, it was "entirely conjectural" 
whether AlP AC would produce information in response to the 
hypothetical FEC enforcement action the plaintiffs sought. For that 
matter, it was conjectural whether the FEC would order AlP AC to tum 
over the information after investigating the allegations on remand. Yet a 
majority of the Court found standing. In public law cases brought to 
enforce a "right" or to "right a wrong" that is undifferentiated amongst 
the public, Akins renders the Lujan formulation of causation and 
redressability obsolete. 
Accordingly, in informational cases under Akins, a lack of 
information that must be disclosed under the statute should be per se 
sufficient injury, much as it is well-established that "[a] person seeking 
information under the FOIA ... need not have a personal stake in the 
information sought" to bring suit.229 The filing of a FOIA request and its 
denial is sufficient "harm" to distinguish the plaintiff from the general 
populace for Article III purposes.230 Under Lujan, one could argue that 
228. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571 (1992) (plurality opinion). 
229. McDonnell v. United States, 4 F.3d 1227, 1237-38 (3d Cir. 1993). 
230. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166,204 (1974) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (citing 5 
U.S.C. § 552(a)(3»; McDonnell, 4 F.3d at 1238. The Supreme Court has long recognized that no 
showing of need for specific information is necessary to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal courts 
as a matter of constitutional law. It is well-established that even though a FOIA plaintiff's injury-a 
lack of information-is shared generally, the generalized nature of that grievance is not a 
constitutional barrier to standing. Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440,449 (1989) 
(citing U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989); 
U.S. Dep't of Justice v. Julian, 486 U.S. I (1988); United States v. Weber Aircraft Corp., 465 U.S. 
792 (1984); FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615 (1982); Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 
(1976». 
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the absence of information sought by a FOIA request, without more, is 
too generalized and lacking in particularity to be cognizable, and that 
many FOIA requesters' transparent aim to pry into the workings of the 
government and bring lawsuits to impact administrative enforcement 
activity dispels any notion of legitimate need?3' But the horribles 
expected to flow from an overbearing judiciary in the citizen-suit arena 
have not occurred with FOIA litigation. Aside from delays in 
administrative processing, the statute seems to work; one searches in 
vain for lower-court decisions addressing standing to bring a FOIA case. 
Once in court, the cases go right to the merits, without long and 
expensive preliminary litigation to divine injury within the meaning of 
conflicting Supreme Court case law. Indeed, FECA litigation gives 
credence to the notion that if standing hearings were routine in the FOIA 
context, "[a]gencies reluctant to disclose information would have a 
powerful incentive both to stall and to find that the requester does not 
have standing. ,,232 
The Supreme Court found "no reason for a different rule" under the 
Federal Advisory Commission Act (FACA),m which stipulates that 
minutes, records, and reports of Executive Branch advisory committees 
be made available to the public, so long as they do not fall within one of 
the FOIA's disclosure exemptions.234 In a challenge by a public interest 
group to the Department of Justice's refusal to divulge the names of 
potential judicial nominees submitted to a committee of the American 
Bar Association, the Court rejected the argument that a plaintiffs 
attempt to seek access to such information was a nonjusticiable "general 
grievance," citing the FOIA as authority.235 
Like the FOIA and the F ACA, which "specifically provide for and 
are intended to promote 'disclosure and public access' to the workings of 
government and a policy of 'government in the sunshine,,,,236 the FECA 
promotes the goals of disclosure and public access that justified the 
231. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife: Standing as a Judicially Imposed 
Limit on Legislative Power, 42 DUKE L.J. 1170, 1189 (1993) ("Perhaps [the] interest is derivative of 
the general public's interest in knowing what the government is doing. If so, that would seem to be 
an 'undifferentiated public interest' that Congress cannot convert 'into an "individual right" 
vindicable in the courts.'" (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 577)). 
232. Id. at 1190; see also Mark Tushnet, "Meet the New Boss ": The New Judicial Center, 83 
N.C. L. REv. 1205, 1213-14 n.40 (2005) (observing that the "impairment of public access" to 
information as an injury sufficient to confer standing in the ordinary FOIA case goes unquestioned). 
233. Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 449. 
234. 5 U.S.c. app. § lO(a)(2), (d) (2000). 
235. Pub. Citizen, 491 U.S. at 448-50. 
236. Am. Farm Bureau v. U.S. EPA, 121 F. Supp. 2d 84, 98 (D.D.C. 2000). 
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Supreme Court's straightforward standing jurisprudence elsewhere.237 If 
voters have more complete information under the FECA, and their votes 
are in fact influenced by information regarding the source of a 
candidate's money or how it is spent, candidates may become mindful of 
compliance in a way that they are not now, precisely because the 
outcome of the election-rather than modest after-the-fact fines-could 
be affected. 238 If candidates know who is funding their opponents, they 
also can more fairly respond. 
Resolution of standing disputes in cases seeking election-related 
information under the FECA's citizen-suit provision should, like FOIA 
and FECA cases, be facile and uncontroversial. Courts should deny 
motions to dismiss for lack of standing in such cases sua sponte and 
order the FEC to pay the plaintiff's fees and costs. The frontier of 
standing litigation in public law cases could then properly shift to 
whether to apply Akins in lieu of Lujan in noninformational citizen suits, 
not whether Akins applies at all.239 
But what, then, is left of Lujan standing in cases brought under 
citizen-suit statutes if Akins is taken to its logical extreme? Congress's 
ability to create a justiciable "right" to information does not mean that 
any government activity is open to judicial scrutiny on the theory that it 
informs voters. Akins did not overrule the separation of powers principle 
that courts are not constitutionally authorized to second-guess policy 
decisions by the elected branches. On this question, Justice Kennedy's 
concurrence in Lujan is revealing. In accepting the controversial 
proposition that Congress does have the power to define novel injuries 
that will give rise to a case or controversy, he observed that, "[i]n 
exercising this power . . . Congress must at the very least identify the 
injury it seeks to vindicate and relate the injury to the class of persons 
237. See supra notes 229-36 and accompanying text (discussing FOIA and FACA standing). 
238. Whether the election and campaign finance laws in fact operate to make the system more 
fair is another debater's point that is outside the scope of this Article. Cj Bradley A. Smith, 
Campaign Finance Reform: Searching for Corruption in All the Wrong Places, 2002-2003 CATO 
SUP. CT. REv. 187, 197-201 (2003) (challenging the assumption that limitations on campaign 
contributions inhibit corruption). 
239. There is a large body of standing law and scholarship that has developed with respect to 
environmental litigation in particular. See generally, e.g., Adrienne Smith, Standing and the 
National Environmental Policy Act: Where Substance, Procedure, and Information Collide, 85 B.U. 
L. REv. 633, 653-62 (2005) (arguing that standing law should allow plaintiffs to sue under NEPA on 
an informational theory). This Article does not address the application of Akins to environmental 
cases, although the majority of citizen-suit statutes do appear in that context. See supra note 33. 
The thesis of this Article is, rather, that Akins should be brought to the forefront of standing litigation 
in analogous circumstances instead of dismissing it as confined to voter suits for information under 
the FECA. 
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entitled to bring suit.,,24o He deemed the ESA insufficient, because it did 
not establish that there is an injury by virtue of a violation.241 Although 
Akins reconfigured standing law in cases implicating so-called 
generalized grievances, the plaintiffs lack of election-related 
information sets that case apart from the citizen suit challenging 
government action on ideological grounds. But the Akins Court provided 
no guidance on where to draw the line between ideology and cognizable 
injury where the injury is widely shared. As a consequence, the scope of 
standing to sue under statutes that authorize the public to vindicate more 
abstract procedural injuries-such as the right to interagency 
consultation at issue in Lujan-remains ambiguous. 
A statute that expressly draws the connection Justice Kennedy found 
lacking-the easiest case-should, like the FECA, trigger standing per 
se, or at least a presumption of standing that can only be rebutted with a 
clear showing of contrary congressional intent. But poorly worded 
legislation that invites lawyers to spin "injuries" from creative 
application of the myriad canons of statutory construction should be 
viewed with a jaundiced eye. After Akins, which turned primarily-if 
not exclusively-on the identification of statutory injury, the injury-in-
fact prong of the Lujan test remains central in statutory standing cases, 
and must be carefully construed. 
Causation and redressability is another matter. Although Lujan and 
its progeny conceive of all three prongs as equally vigorous under Article 
III, the Supreme Court has treated causation and redressability as 
dispensible in other public law cases, raising the question of whether 
they are meaningful in that context at all. In Utah v. Evans/42 the Court 
found that Utah had standing to challenge the legality of the 2000 Census 
counting method that caused it to lose a congressional representative.243 
A recount would have required the Secretary of Commerce to issue a 
new set of numbers, the President to accept them, and the issuance of a 
new reapportionment statement to Congress?44 Pronouncing that "[ w]e 
read limitations on our jurisdiction to review narrowly," the Court found 
the alleged injury redressable because "[v ]ictory would mean a 
declaration leading, or an injunction requiring, the Secretary [of 
Commerce] to substitute a new 'report' for an old one," which in tum 
240. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
241. Id. 
242. 536 U.S. 452 (2002). 
243. Id. at 459-61. 
244. See id. at 463 (declaring that a Utah victory would require a new census report). 
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could lead to mechanical recalculations related to apportionment.245 
Thus, "the courts would have ordered a change in a legal status (that of 
the 'report'), and the practical consequence of that change would amount 
to a significant increase in the likelihood that the plaintiff would obtain 
relief that directly redresses the injury suffered.,,246 The Court cited 
Akins as an example of its having "found standing in similar 
circumstances.,,247 
Justice Scalia again dissented, charging the majority with committing 
"a flagrant violation of the separation of powers,,248 because redress 
depends on exercise of the President's discretion as well as that of "a 
majority of 435 Representatives and 100 Senators ... whom federal 
courts are equally powerless to order to take official acts.,,249 Redress in 
Akins, he further reasoned, did not require action by a third party who 
could not be brought before a federal court and "for whom (as for the 
President) it would be disrespectful for us to presume a course of 
action.,,25o This awkward attempt to bring Akins within the Lujan 
framework only underscores their cases' incompatability, as 
redressability has never turned on whether the third party is or is not 
coercible or whether it "displays a gross disrespect" for courts to assume 
that it is. The Evans Court's cavalier redressability analysis 
demonstrates that, despite the perceived historical roots of a strict test for 
individualized injury, the Supreme Court has begun to recognize that 
Lujan does not readily fit every standing case. 
Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOe), 
Inc. 251 is another striking example of a disintegrating redressability 
standard. In that case, the Court upheld environmental groups' statutory 
standing to bring suit against the holder of a pollution permit under the 
citizen-suit provision of the Clean Water Act (CWAi52 based on the 
"quantum of deterrence" that the statute's civil penalties create, casting 
doubt on the vitality of the second and third prongs of the Lujan 
analysis.253 The Court concluded that, "[t]o the extent [civil penalties] 
245. Id. 
246. [d. at 464 (emphasis added). 
247. !d. 
248. [d. at 514 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
249. [d. at 511-12. 
250. Id. at 514. 
251. 528 U.S. 167 (2000). 
252. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2000). 
253. 528 U.S. at 187-88. Unlike Akins, Laidlaw has been the subject of significant academic 
commentary that I will not attempt to summarize here except to note that it is a particularly 
important counterpoint to Lujan because both cases involved environmental citizen-suit statutes. See 
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encourage defendants to discontinue current violations and deter them 
from committing future ones, the afford redress to citizen plaintiffs.,,254 
Recognizing the implications of such a trajectory for standing 
jurisprudence, Justice Scalia called the Court's weakened application of 
injury-in-fact in Laidlaw "a lever that will move the world,,,255 as it 
"come[s] close to 'mak[ing] the redressability requirement vanish'" and 
"place[s] the immense power of suing to enforce the public laws in 
private hands.,,256 He charged in dissent that the Court's allowance of 
citizen suits for civil penalties under the CW A "has grave implications 
for democratic governance," and he challenged a standing model that 
would apply the redressability requirement merely to ensure that the 
plaintiff received some tangential benefit from a favorable judgment.257 
A similar watering-down of Lujan standing-and a consequent shift 
towards an analysis of congressional intent in the public law context-
has appeared in lower-court decisions. In Hodges v. Abraham,258 for 
example, the Fourth Circuit blithely held that NEPA plaintiffs possess a 
procedural right to have the Executive observe procedures mandated by 
law "without meeting all the normal standards for redressability and 
immediacy.,,259 In Ethyl Corp. v. EPA,26o a court found that a 
manufacturer of fuel additives had standing to sue the EPA to enforce the 
Clean Air Act's requirement of an "open procedure" for conducting 
environmental tests on an Akins-type injury theory. 261 The plaintiff 
successfully argued that the information sought "might well help it 
develop and improve its products with an eye to conformity to emissions 
needs,,,262 and the court remanded the case with directions that the 
agency essentially abide by the statute and establish test methods and 
procedures.263 Recently, a U.S. district court in California found 
generally Citizen Suits and the Future of Standing in the 21st Century: From Lujan to Laidlaw and 
Beyond, II & 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'y F. (SPECIAL DOUBLE ISSUE) (2001). 
254. Laidlaw, 528 U.S. at 186 (emphasis added). 
255. Id. at 205 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
256. Id. at 215 (alteration in original) (quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 
83, 107 (1998». 
257. Id. at 202. The Court observed that the "federal Executive Branch does not share the 
dissent's view that such suits dissipate its authority to enforce the law," as "the Department of 
Justice has endorsed this citizen suit from the outset" in amicus briefs and that "the Federal 
Government retains the power to foreclose a citizen suit by undertaking its own action." Id. at 188 
n.4 (majority opinion). 
258. 300 F.3d 432 (4th Cir. 2002). 
259. Id. at 444 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992». 
260. 306 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2002). 
261. /d. at 1147-48, 1150. 
262. Id. at 1147. 
263. Id. at 1150. 
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justiciable a suit under the Americans with Disabilities Act that 
challenged barriers to access that the plaintiff did not suffer himself.264 
The court found standing based on an expert witness's inspection of the 
store in question during discovery on the theory that "Congress . . . 
stat[ ed] that the purpose of the Act was to create a 'mandate for the 
elimination of discrimination' not just the weakening or reduction of 
discrimination which is what the case would be if plaintiffs were only 
allowed to bring suit for barriers that absolutely denied access.,,265 The 
court dismissed causation and redressability concerns in a footnote as not 
having "been raised" and not "reasonably" worth raising.266 
In part because the train has already left the station in terms of 
recognizing statutory standing in cases involving something less than 
redressable particularized injury, a forthright recasting of the Lujan 
standard in public law cases is becoming increasingly necessary. As the 
FEC has specifically argued in attempting to dispel the obvious reach of 
Akins, Lujan is so entrenched in the psyche of justiciability jurisprudence 
that it seems "radical" to challenge it at all.267 Courts should, however, 
as a threshold matter read Akins as expressly disavowing the causation 
and redressability prongs of the traditional test for administrative cases, 
where they have little content, and look primarily to whether Congress 
created a nonabstract "injury"-by, for example, conferring a right to 
information-within the meaning of Akins. 268 
After all, agencies on remand are not constrained to a particular 
substantive outcome. In revisiting the facts and the law under judicial 
guidelines, an agency may arrive at a perfectly lawful decision that 
leaves the initial injury unredressed. Courts have therefore recognized 
that causation is satisfied "when a plaintiff demonstrates that the 
challenged agency action authorizes the conduct that allegedly caused 
the plaintiffs injuries, if that conduct would allegedly be illegal 
otherwise.,,269 In cases involving regulation of a third party, Lujan 
causation is almost never present because the link between the 
264. Wilson v. Pier I Imports (US), Inc., 413 F. Supp. 2d 1130,1135 (E.D. Cal. 2006). 
265. [d. at 1133 (quoting 42 U.S.c. § 12101(b)(I) (2000)). The court also discussed the split 
among district courts on this issue. [d. at 1132-35. 
266. [d. at 1132 n.3. 
267. See supra note 116 and accompanying text. 
268. See Wyo. Outdoor Council v. U.S. Forest Serv., 165 FJd 43, 51 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
(indicating that in procedural rights cases the "necessary showing" supporting the "constitutional 
minima of injury-in-fact, causation, and redressability ... is reduced"). 
269. See Animal Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Glickman, 154 FJd 426, 440 (D.C. CiT. 1998) (en 
banc) (emphasis added) (upholding standing in facial challenge to regulations allegedly authorizing 
statutorily proscribed inhumane treatment of animals). 
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government activity and the claimed injury is necessarily tenuous insofar 
as it is contingent on nonparties' behavior. Akins fully embraced this 
inevitability. 
The rise of the administrative state no doubt contributes to the Lujan-
Akins dilemma over causation and redressability, because it naturally 
occasions an increase in litigation to enforce public values. In his Lujan 
concurrence, Justice Kennedy observed that as "Government programs 
and policies become more complex and farreaching, ... [m]odern 
litigation has progressed far from the paradigm of Marbury suing 
Madison to get his commission.,,27o Increased legislation and the 
expansion of the powers of the Executive Branch naturally prompt 
litigation to enforce statutory mandates.271 Such litigation is arguably the 
very litigation to enforce public values that Lujan rejects. But it is also 
unavoidable, which is perhaps why-notwithstanding Lujan---courts 
have not strictly applied the causation and redressability requirements in 
a number of administrative cases.272 
Akins represents a more modern conception of standing that is 
attuned to the realities of administrative litigation. The injury-in-fact test 
was designed to restrict individuals' ability to sue to enforce the legal 
duties of agencies with greatly augmented powers. Given the nature of 
common law claims, it is unsurprising that the test is apt to favor the 
regulated-who are readily able to demonstrate particularized injury-
over the individual who as a member of the public is a beneficiary of the 
law.273 The position that statutory beneficiaries have standing to sue to 
implement a law only if they too can demonstrate injury that is direct and 
particularized and thus akin to that suffered by a regulated party is 
suspect. If one accepts the constitutionality of the delegation of 
270. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 580 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (I Cranch) 137 (1803». 
271. See Sunstein, supra note 5, at 179 (explaining that the current standing doctrine developed 
"as part and parcel of the heated struggle, in the 1920s and the 1930s, within the country and the 
courts about the constitutional legitimacy of the emerging regulatory state"). 
272. In a remarkable footnote, Justice Scalia conceded in Lujan that "one living adjacent to the 
site for proposed construction of a federally licensed dam has standing to challenge the licensing 
agency's failure to prepare an environmental impact statement, even though he cannot establish with 
any certainty that the statement will cause the license to be withheld or altered" but that people 
living at the other end of the country would not. 504 U.S. at 572 n.7. Even under Lujan itself, 
therefore, the causation and redressability requirements wiggle. 
273. The test has been challenged as having a disproportionately negative impact on the poor 
and disenfranchised. See, e.g., Nichol, supra note 59, at 333 ("Anomalously, the power to trigger 
judicial review is afforded most readily to those who have traditionally enjoyed the greatest access to 
the processes of democratic government. ... Minority plaintiffs, poor litigants, unwed mothers, 
black prisoners, and indigent patients get the harshest treatment in injury law."). 
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Executive power to agencies,274 the realities of the administrative state 
require a more practical standing analysis in citizen suits against the 
federal government. 
While the permutations of extending Akins's premises to other 
citizen-suit statutes can only be revealed slowly through lower-court 
decisions, judicial acknowledgement that Akins repudiated Lujan and 
established injury per se in cases seeking information under the FECA is 
an important first step in bringing order to this dizzying area of the law, 
and may be inevitable as a natural consequence of the expansion of the 
modern administrative state. Rather than purporting to apply Lujan in a 
context where it does not fit, courts should distinguish Lujan and adopt 
an approach that squarely acknowledges that the public law model of 
adjudication has a legitimate place in public law litigation. 
B. Administrative Litigation and Substantive Review: Two Bites at the 
Article II Apple? 
The foregoing subpart attempts to make the case for treating FECA 
plaintiffs seeking election-related information as establishing standing 
per se, and for recognizing that Akins and later cases have marginalized 
the causation and redressability requirements in such a way as to render 
them less meaningful in broader public law contexts. The 
counterargument that would denounce increased access to the courts-
and urge reversion to Lujan in FECA cases-is really about Article II, 
not Article III. The Take Care Clause grants the President the exclusive 
authority to "faithfully execute[]" federal law as enacted 275 As Professor 
Sunstein has observed, "[i]t is for this reason that the standard 
administrative law case raises no issue under the Take Care Clause. If an 
object of regulation establishes that an agency has enforced the law in an 
unlawful way, the President has violated his duty under the Take Care 
Clause.,,276 Courts can constitutionally adjudicate such a dispute. 
Although the Supreme Court has already established that a citizen cannot 
invoke the judiciary to compel most agency enforcement activity,277 
standing to sue an agency should not be construed in a way that nullifies 
congressional directives and leaves the Executive Branch free to 
disregard the law. 
274. See TRIBE, supra note 81, at 131 (discussing constitutionality of the administrative state). 
275. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
276. Sunstein, supra note 5, at 212. 
277. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
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The separation-of-powers concerns underlying Lujan, although 
legitimate, are addressed elsewhere in the administrative review process. 
Plaintiffs suing a federal government agency under the generic review 
provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)278 must, of 
course, satisfy Article III standing in every case. Those who can 
demonstrate injury-in-fact sufficient to distinguish themselves from 
someone who sues as the people's representative avenging a so-called 
"generalized grievance" find themselves faced with very deferential 
substantive standards for obtaining review of agency inaction under the 
AP A. A bald claim that the agency is not doing its job will survive 
neither a motion to dismiss for lack of standing nor a motion for 
summary judgment on the merits for substantially similar reasons. As a 
consequence, the relationship between standing to sue a federal agency 
for vindication of procedural rights and the standards for securing 
substantive review of agency action support an interpretation of Akins 
that enables interested parties to bring challenges to government 
nonenforcement decisions under an appropriately worded citizen-suit 
statute, while continuing to afford agencies the deference they already 
enjoy under the APA. 
The Supreme Court's APA jurisprudence reflects movement from a 
default standard of reviewability279 toward one of unreviewability in 
cases involving agency refusals to enforce. The Court held in Heckler v. 
Chanei80 that if Congress has not established standards for review of 
agency activity, the courts are without jurisdiction to review the action 
for the same reasons that a court, applying Lujan, could dismiss on 
standing grounds: arbitrariness challenges to the Executive are for the 
political branches, not the courtS.281 In Norton v. Southern Utah 
Wilderness Alliance,282 the Court deemed agency inactivity largely 
unreviewable under § 706(1) of the AP A, which sets forth a cause of 
action to "compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably 
delayed,,,283 because courts can only compel agencies to take discrete 
278. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (2000). 
279. See Steenholdt v. FAA, 314 F.3d 633, 638 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citing Abbott Labs. v. 
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967)) (setting forth general rule of reviewability under the APA); 
Sierra Club v. Yeutter, 911 F.2d 1405, 1410 (10th CiT. 1990) (citing Abbott Labs., 387 U.S. at 140) 
("As a general matter, all agency action is presumed reviewable."). 
280. 470 U.S. 821 (1985). 
281. See id. at 830-32 (holding that agency decisions regarding whether to take enforcement 
action are presumptively unreviewable, because there is "no law to apply" under the "committed to 
agency discretion" exception to APA review). 
282. 542 U.S. 55 (2004). 
283. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1). 
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actions under the AP A; broad programmatic attacks on agency action are 
for the political process to resolve. 284 For its part, the FECA provides no 
mechanism by which a third party may obtain judicial review of the 
FEC's enforcement decisions after an investigation has been 
conducted?85 All that can be achieved by invoking the citizen-suit 
provision is an order requiring the agency to take the next investigative 
step?86 
Although the FECA' s private right of action does impinge on agency 
discretion to direct resources away from the investigative process in 
certain cases, because of the statute's limited scope, the argument for 
rigorous standing analyses in § 437g(a)(8) suits is not compelling. More 
pragmatic are the implications of a per se informational standing analysis 
under Akins. A careful look at the D.C. Circuit's opinion in CREW v. 
FEC8? is illustrative. Although the complaint was ultimately dismissed 
for lack of standing, the holding turned in part on the court's notation 
that that CREW "agree[d] with the Commission's reason-to-believe 
determinations and expresse[d] satisfaction that it received 'a publicly 
disclosed ruling that the administrative respondents violated the law. ",288 
In other words, Judge Randolph wrote, "we do not know what legal 
principle CREW thinks the Commission ... violated.,,289 Or as the 
district court put it, "CREW has received all or more than it is due under 
FECA," including the FEC's assessment of the list's value (zero), and 
that there was no requirement under the FECA that "the FEC ... value 
an in-kind contribution in the form of a contact list.,,290 Thus, the court 
dismissed the complaint in part because CREW's claim on the merits 
was fatally flawed. The FEC's exercise of its prosecutorial discretion in 
284. Norton, 542 U.S. at 64. See generally Bressman, supra note 59 (discussing arbitrariness 
approach to judicial review of agency inaction). 
285. See Perot v. FEC, 97 F.3d 553, 558 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1996) ("Apart from § 437g(a)(8)(C), 
there is no private right of action to enforce FECA against an alleged violator."); cf Republican 
Nat' I Comm. v. FEC, 76 F.3d 400, 404 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (applying Chevron deference to FEC 
regulation). 
286. Under § 437g(a)(8)(c), the complainant may bring a civil action to remedy the violation 
alleged in the original complaint if the Commission fails to conform to the district court's 
declaration that the dismissal of the administrative complaint was contrary to law. 2 U.S.C. § 
437g(a)(8)(C) (2000). The district court reviews the propriety of the dismissal under a deferential 
standard that considers whether the FEC's construction of a statute is sufficiently reasonable to be 
accepted by a reviewing court. FEC v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 37, 
39 (1981). 
287. 475 F.3d 337 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also supra notes 124-42 and accompanying text 
(discussing the facts and holding of CREW). 
288. CREW, 475 F.3d at 340 (quoting Br. for Appellant 22). 
289. ld. 
290. Citizens for Responsibility & Ethics in Wash. [CREW] v. FEC, 401 F. Supp. 2d 115, 121 
n.2 (D.D.C. 2005), affd, 475 F.3d 337. 
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letting this violation go, although politically troublesome to CREW, was 
not unlawful. Moreover, unlike in Kean, the FEC had undertaken the 
investigation on its own accord, which resulted in the disclosure of a 
great deal of information to the public, including the fact "that an illegal 
in-kind contribution took place," "that the in-kind contribution was a 
master contact list containing the names and contact information of 
conservative activists," "that the list's monetary value [was] negligible," 
and "the identities of the individuals and campaign involved in the illegal 
transaction. ,,291 
Had the FEC refused to conduct the initial investigation, however, 
none of this information would have been made public. Under an 
informational standing analysis identical to that undertaken by the D.C. 
Circuit,292 it would have lacked jurisdiction to review a complaint by 
CREW challenging the dismissal of the administrative complaint 
preinvestigation on causation and redresssability grounds. Such a ruling 
would clearly be incorrect under Akins. Ultimately, perhaps, the court's 
decision to deny standing had much to do with the fact that the FEC had 
satisfied its legal obligations and CREW had obtained all the information 
it reasonably needed. Had the court applied Akins to find standing and 
resolved the claim on the merits, the standing analysis would be less 
prone to the subjective manipulation Lujan critics decry.293 
Yet Article III should not be interpreted so flexibly that courts are 
thrust into the center of the political arena. The limited role of the 
judiciary in our system of government forecloses a justiciability doctrine 
that would render cognizable all generalized claims seeking intangible 
public benefits, a scenario that would undermine-if not eliminate-the 
separation of powers. Some inquiry is necessary to ascertain whether 
this plaintiff is mired in a case or controversy against the government 
that warrants judicial attention. Although the injury-in-fact test has 
served the crude function of narrowing the range of litigants-thus the 
kinds of public law cases-that federal courts adjudicate, its purported 
intolerance for any judicial review to enforce public values is simply out 
of step with the realities of modem administrative law, and is not 
explicitly mandated by Article III in any event. It dramatizes Article II 
concerns that are separately addressed in the review provisions under the 
APA, as construed by the Supreme Court.294 
291. Id. at 121. 
292. See supra notes 124-37. 
293. Cf Fletcher, supra note 62, at 223 (arguing that "standing should simply be a question on 
the merits of plaintiff's claim"). 
294. See supra note 278 and accompanying text (discussing judicial interpretation of the APA). 
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To be sure, Akins and Lujan crossed swords on the basic question of 
congressional power to confer standing by defining an interest-and 
conversely, an injury-by statute. Justice Scalia deemed it "obvious" in 
Lujan that 
[t]o permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest in 
executive officers' compliance with the law into an "individual right" 
vindicable in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the 
President to the courts the Chief Executive's most important 
constitutional duty, to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed. ,,295 
But citizen-suit statutes such as the FECA, along with the APA,296 each 
represent a determination by Congress to enhance a particular public 
value, and thus a collective public acceptance of the interest the 
legislation protects. 297 The FECA' s judicial review provisions similarly 
manifest congressional choice regarding the best way to implement a 
statute and ensure agency accountability for failure to enforce the 
FECA's disclosure requirements. An elected Congress may better 
represent democratic will than agency heads and administrators who are 
politically accountable only indirectly (through the control of an elected 
President). Its citizen-suit legislation by its very nature contemplates 
separation-of-powers concerns. Standing notwithstanding, the modest 
infringement of agency discretion under the FECA's citizen-suit 
provision does not justify its nullification on separation-of-powers 
grounds under the auspices of Article III justiciability. 
V. CONCLUSION 
A test for Article III standing devoid of arbitrariness is an oxymoron. 
But arbitrariness is not confusion and obfuscation. The Akins Court's 
failure to make clear that it was departing from Lujan in its analysis of 
causation and redressability has made it difficult for citizen-standing 
jurisprudence to develop with clarity and direction. Whether Akins is the 
better view depends in part on whether other checks on overzealous 
judicial review of Executive action suffice. The myriad critiques of the 
FEC and the circumscribed applicability of the FECA's citizen-suit 
provision suggest that Congress acted reasonably in determining that 
295. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3). 
296. 5 U.S.c. §§ 701-706 (2000). 
297. See Nichol, supra note 20, at 1947 ("Legislative enactment reflects shared acceptance of 
the interest and typically alleviates any concern over separation of powers."). 
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there is a role for the judiciary in ensuring the statute's enforcement. 
That role must be carefully circumscribed, but the congressional 
determination that Executive checks on unelected agency officials' 
conduct do not suffice to ensure implementation of the law in certain 
contexts is not expressly prohibited by the Constitution. The question 
remaining is how far is too far in evaluating Congress's exercise of its 
authority to legislate standing and what criteria should inform the 
answer. 
As a first step, this Article seeks to recapture Akins's main 
contribution to standing jurisprudence, which is often lost. Akins, 
properly construed, sets forth a rule of law that is refreshingly resistant to 
line-drawing. The lack of subjectivity is what most distinguishes Akins's 
standard for informational injury from Lujan's injury-in-fact test.298 
Akins also dilutes particularized injury, causation and redressability in 
ways that cut across many administrative actions. If Congress creates a 
right to information, plaintiffs can sue an agency to obtain that 
information, even if the citizenry at large shares the plaintiff s injury and 
even if ultimate redress depends both on the exercise of agency 
discretion and the actions of third parties that are not named in the 
lawsuit. Courts should squarely apply Akins to FECA cases seeking 
information and take steps to dissuade the FEC from pursuing a strategy 
of challenging Akins standing under all circumstances. 
Because the merits of administrative challenges to Executive refusals 
to enforce are governed by highly deferential standards of review, the 
separation-of-powers concerns underlying the Lujan test are adequately 
addressed by the more forgiving Akins inquiry in citizen-suit cases 
brought to prompt enforcement action. Its proper application would 
avoid cumbersome litigation over particularized injury-litigation that 
can keep worthy plaintiffs from having their day in court based on 
idiosyncratic factual analysis-while protecting against citizen lawsuits 
that attempt to second-guess Executive activity in contravention of 
Article II. 
298. See Nichol, supra note 59, at 316-22 (discussing problems with the Lujan standard). 
